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Abstract. It has recently been shown that cryptographic trilinear maps
are sufficient for achieving indistinguishability obfuscation. In this paper
we develop a method for constructing such maps on the Weil descent
(restriction) of abelian varieties over finite fields, including the Jaco-
bian varieties of hyperelliptic curves and elliptic curves. The security
of these candidate cryptographic trilinear maps raises several interesting
questions, including the computational complexity of a trapdoor discrete
logarithm problem.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic applications of multilinear maps beyond bilinear maps were first
proposed in the work of Boneh and Silverberg [3]. However the existence of cryp-
tographically interesting n-multilinear maps for n > 2 remains an open problem.
The problem has attracted much attention more recently as multilinear maps
and their variants have become a useful tool for indistinguishability obfuscation.
Initially coined in the work of Barak et al. [2], indistinguishability obfuscation is
a powerful notion with sweeping applications and far reaching consequences in
cryptography. Very recently Lin and Tessaro [11] showed that trilinear maps are
sufficient for the purpose of achieving indistinguishability obfuscation (see [11]
for references to related works along several lines of investigation). The striking
result of Lin and Tessaro [11] has brought the following question into the spot-
light: can a cryptographically interesting algebraic trilinear map be constructed?
In this paper we develop a method for constructing such trilinear maps on the
Weil descent (restriction) of abelian varieties over finite fields, including the Ja-
cobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves and elliptic curves.
A natural place to look for n-multilinear maps for n > 2 is e´tale cohomology.
The challenge however is identifying a promising candidate in the abstract form
of e´tale cohomology that may have concrete and efficient realization. For exam-
ple, Huang and Raskind [10] gave n-multilinear generalization of Tate pairing
under suitable conditions, for n even. However the generalized n-multilinear Tate
pairing naturally takes values in n/2-fold tensor product of µℓ, the group of ℓ-th
roots of unity, therefore requires solving CDH (computational Diffie-Hellman)
problem when n > 2 to consolidate the value of pairing in µℓ. In fact Boneh and
Silverberg (see Corollary 7.6 in [3]) gave necessary conditions that seem difficult
to satisfy for Galois-equivariant n-multilinear maps taking values in µℓ. How-
ever Chinburg (at the AIM workshop on cryptographic multilinear maps (2017))
recently demonstrated a trilinear map taking values in µℓ can be derived from
e´tale cohomology, and this was the starting point of our line of investigation.
Following up on Chinburg’s observation we take the following approach to
construct trilinear maps. We start with a principally polarized abelian variety
over a finite field and make use of the pairing of the torsion points, as well as
the action of endomorphisms on the torsion points to construct a trilinear map.
To strengthen the security of the third pairing group, which acts on the second
pairing group through endomorphisms, we apply the idea of Weil descent (or Weil
restriction) [1,7]. The security of the trilinear maps constructed in this paper
raises several interesting questions, including the computational complexity of a
trapdoor discrete logarithm problem.
1.1 General idea of construction
Our line of investigation was motivated by an observation of Chinburg that the
following map from e´tale cohomology may serve as the basis of constructing a
cryptographically interesting trilinear map:
H1(A, µℓ)×H
1(A, µℓ)×H
2(A, µℓ)→ H
4(A, µ⊗ℓ 3)
∼= µℓ
where A is an abelian surface over a finite field F and the prime ℓ 6= char(F). This
trilinear map is the starting point of the following more concrete construction.
Suppose A is a principally polarized abelian variety over a finite field F. Let
A∗ denote the dual abelian variety. Consider A as a variety over F¯, the algebraic
closure of F. Let eℓ be the pairing between A[ℓ] and A
∗[ℓ] ([14] § 16).
In [8] the following trilinear map (α, β,L) → eℓ(α, ϕL(β)) was considered,
where α, β ∈ A[ℓ], L is an invertible sheaf, and ϕL be the map A→ A
∗ = Pic0(A)
so that
ϕL(a) = t
∗
aL ⊗ L
−1 ∈ Pic0(A)
for a ∈ A(F¯) where ta is the translation map defined by by a ([14] § 1 and § 6).
Note that in the map just described we no longer need to assume that A is
of dimension 2.
Below we describe the general idea of constructing a cryptographic trilinear
map motivated by the above discussion.
Our goal is to construct an Fℓ-linear map G1×G2×G3 → G4 with Gi ∼= Z/ℓZ
as groups for i = 1, . . . , 4. The basic requirement is that the discrete logarithm
problems on the four groups are computationally hard while the trilinear map
is efficient to compute.
The basic setup of our construction can be described as follows. Suppose V is
a finite dimensional vector space over Fℓ with an efficiently computable pairing
e : V ×V → µℓ. Let EndV denote the ring of endomorphism of V as an Fℓ-vector
space. We choose α, β ∈ V with e(α, β) 6= 1, and set Gi as the group generated
by α and β respectively for i = 1 and 2. Let E0 = {λ ∈ EndV : e(α, λβ) = 1}.
We form the third group G3 as a quotient U1/U where U is a submodule of E0
and U1 = Fℓ + U . Then we have a trilinear map G1 × G2 × G3 → µℓ sending
(aα, bβ, c+ λ) to e(aα, c+ λ(bβ)) = e(α, β)abc for a, b, c ∈ Fℓ and λ ∈ U .
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In our construction V = A[ℓ] the set of ℓ-torsion points of an abelian variety
A over a finite field. We assume A is simple and principally polarized. Let e :
A[ℓ] × A[ℓ] → µℓ be a non-degenerate skew-symmetric pairing. An important
example is the pairing defined by a principal polarization of A and the canonical
pairing between ℓ-power torsion points of A and the dual abelian variety. We will
need to make sure that the pairing e is efficiently computable. For now suppose
this is the case. We find α, β ∈ A[ℓ] such that e(α, β) 6= 1, and let G1 and G2 be
respectively the cyclic groups generated by α and β.
As the first attempt we may take G3 as a quotientW1/W whereW1 = Fℓ+W
and W is a submodule of E0 = {λ ∈ End(A[ℓ]) : e(α, λ(β)) = 1}. And we have
a trilinear map G1 × G2 × G3 → µℓ sending (aα, bβ, c + W ) to ζ
abc where
ζ = e(α, β).
We need a representative f ∈ c+W to be specified in such a way that f can
be efficiently applied to points in G2. On the other hand given f that represents
an element of U1, we want it to be hard to determine c ∈ Fℓ such that f ∈ c+U .
This can be a problem given that the Fℓ-dimension of W1 is bounded by that
of End(A[ℓ]), which is O(g2) where g = dimA. More generally there can be a
problem if G3 is presented explicitly as a quotient U1/U where U1 is a subspace
of some Fℓ vector space of polynomially bounded dimension. The reason is that
in cryptographic applications we often need to assume that polynomially many
samples from U are revealed to the public (hence the adversary). If the dimension
of U is polynomially bounded then a basis of U can likely be determined from
the sampled elements of U . The basis of U together with 1 form a basis of U1.
Now the problem of finding c such that f − c ∈ U is easy.
Our strategy in meeting the challenge involves Weil descent (or Weil restric-
tion) [1,7]. Weil descent was introduced by Frey [6] as a constructive tool in
cryptography to disguise elliptic curves. In [5] Dent and Galbraith applied the
idea to construct trapdoor DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) groups by disguising
elliptic curves in order to hide pairings. In our approach, Weil descent is involved
for deeper reasons than disguising elliptic curves or abelian varieties, as will be
seen in our discussions below. We remark that the construction in [5] is vulner-
able to the attacks described in [16], which depend critically on the addition
morphism of an elliptic curve of interest being given in the projective model
by homogeneous polynomials. The attacks do not extend to our constructions,
where the abelian varieties and maps are given strictly by affine models in affine
pieces.
We now give a brief outline of our approach.
We start with an abelian variety defined over a extension K of finite field k
with d = [K : k], however we proceed to construct the trilinear map on a Weil
descent Aˆ of A. The Weil descent Aˆ is formed with respect to a secret basis of
K over k. Now Aˆ[ℓ] is isomorphic to A[ℓ]d, so EndAˆ[ℓ] contains a submodule
isomorphic to Matd(Fℓ), the algebra of d by d matrices over Fℓ. Utilizing the
secret basis we select a set S of N = dO(1) elements λi ∈ EndAˆ[ℓ] such that
λi corresponds to a matrix Mi ∈ Matd(Fℓ). We consider Aˆ[ℓ] a blinded version
of A[ℓ]d, and λi a blinded version of Mi. The maps λi will be specified in such
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a way that they can be efficiently applied to Aˆ[ℓ] while the matrices Mi are
hidden. Our trilinear map will be derived from a blinded version of the following
trilinear map:
A[ℓ]d ×A[ℓ]d ×Matd(Fℓ)→ µℓ
(α, β,M)→ e(α,M(β))
where α, β ∈ A[ℓ]d, M ∈ Matd(Fℓ) ⊂ End(A[ℓ]
d), and e is a non-degenerate
bilinear pairing on A[ℓ]d (determined by a non-degenerate bilinear pairing on
A[ℓ]).
Let Λ be the Fℓ-algebra generated by N independent variables z1, . . . , zN ,
which is non-commutative for N > 1. Let Λ act on Aˆ[ℓ] such that zi acts as
λi for i = 1, . . . , N . We have a morphism of algebras λ : Λ → Matd(Fℓ) such
that λ(zi) =Mi, for i = 1, . . . , N , serving as a secret trapdoor map. The follow-
ing trilinear map can be considered a blinded version of the trilinear map just
described:
Aˆ[ℓ]× Aˆ[ℓ]× Λ→ µℓ
(αˆ, βˆ, f)→ eˆ(αˆ, f(λ1, . . . , λN )(βˆ))
where αˆ, βˆ ∈ Aˆ[ℓ], f ∈ Λ, and eˆ is pairing on Aˆ[ℓ] which is a blinded version of
e.
To construct our trilinear map we take G1 (resp. G2) to be the cyclic group
generated by a point αˆ in Aˆ[ℓ] (resp. βˆ ∈ Aˆ[ℓ]). To construct the third pairing
group G3, we form a set R1 of relations of degree 2 onMi (hence λi), and publish
the set R of relations on zi whose image under λ is R1. Let J be the two-sided
ideal of Λ generated by R, and let JN be the submodule of J consisting of
elements of degree less than or equal to N . With the action ofMatd(Fℓ) on A[ℓ]
d
blinded by the action of Λ on Aˆ[ℓ], we define the third pairing group G3 in terms
of modules in Λ of exponential dimensions over Fℓ. We set G3 = U1/U ∼= Z/ℓZ
where U = JN and U1 = Fℓ + U . For a ∈ Fℓ, a+ U ∈ G is encoded by a sparse
representative g in a+ U . Given g to determine a seems hard as the dimension
of U is exponentially large. Using R one can formulate a system of quadratic
polynomials in dO(1) variables to determine λ, however solving such a system is
too costly. If the secret descent basis is uncovered, then the trapdoor map λ can
be efficiently determined, and the discrete logarithm problem on G3 is reduced
via λ to Matd(Fℓ), which is a vector space of polynomially bounded dimension.
Therefore the security of the trilinear map depends on the descent basis being a
trapdoor secret, and a methodology is needed to specify maps and functions on
a descent variety while protecting the secrecy of the descent basis. This is the
subject of investigation in the next section.
2 Weil descent and secrecy
Let k be a finite field of q elements and let K be an extension of degree d
over k. Let θ denote a public basis of K over k consisting of θ0, . . . , θd−1 ∈ K.
Every published element of K is explicitly written in this basis. Let u denote a
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secret basis of K over k consisting of u0, . . . , ud−1 ∈ K. The basis u is the basis
with respect to which descent objects are defined. The Galois group G(K/k) is
generated by the Frobenius automorphism σ such that for x ∈ K, σ(x) = xq.
For i ∈ Z, let σi = σ
i mod d.
For xˆ, yˆ ∈ k¯d, let 〈xˆ, yˆ〉 =
∑d−1
i=0 xiyi where xˆ = (xi)
d−1
i=0 and yˆ = (y1)
d−1
i=0 .
Let δ : k¯d → k¯ such that for xˆ = (xj)
d−1
j=0 with xj ∈ k¯, δ(xˆ) =
∑d−1
j=0 xjuj =
〈xˆ,u〉.
We have δσi(xˆ) =
∑d−1
j=0 xju
σi
j = 〈xˆ,u
σi〉.
Let ρ : k¯d → k¯d such that for xˆ ∈ k¯d, ρ(xˆ) = (δσi (xˆ)d−1i=0 .
Let Γ = (uσij )0≤i,j≤d−1. Let W = Γ
−1 = (wij)0≤i,j≤d−1.
Throughout this section it will be useful to consider the basis u as being
secret, hence the maps δ and ρ and the matrices Γ and W are secret as well.
A point xˆ ∈ k¯d is called a descent point if there is some y ∈ k¯ such that
ρxˆ = (yσi)d−1i=0 .
Lemma 1. A descent point that is not k-rational reveals information about u
in the sense that 〈xˆ− xˆσi ,u〉 = 0 for all i.
Proof Suppose y ∈ k¯ is such that ρxˆ = (yσi)d−1i=0 . Since y = 〈xˆ,u〉, we get y
σi =
〈xˆσi ,uσi〉. On the other hand we also have yσi = 〈xˆ,uσi〉 since ρxˆ = (yσi)d−1i=0 .
Therefore 〈xˆ − xˆσi ,u〉 = 0. ✷
We consider descent points weak in light of Lemma 1.
Suppose F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]. Let xˆi = (xij)
d−1
j=0 , for i = 1, . . . , n. Then
F (δ(xˆ1), . . . , δ(xˆn)) =
d−1∑
i=0
fi(xˆ1, . . . , xˆn)ui,
where fi ∈ k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn]. We denote by Fˆ the tuple (fi)
d−1
i=0 .
If we identify k¯dn as the n-fold product k¯d×. . .× k¯d, and by abuse of notation
denote δ as the map k¯dn → k¯n such that δ(xˆ1, . . . , xˆn) = (δ(xˆ1), . . . , δ(xˆn)) where
xˆ1, . . . , xˆn ∈ k¯
d.
Put Xˆ = xˆ1, . . . , xˆn. Let Fˆ = (fi)
d−1
i=0 . Then we may write
F (δ(Xˆ)) = δ(Fˆ (Xˆ)) = 〈Fˆ (Xˆ),u〉.
We have
F σi(δσi(Xˆ)) = δσi(Fˆ (Xˆ)) = 〈Fˆ (Xˆ),uσi〉.
Consider the map F : k¯n → k¯ defined by F sending (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ k¯
n to
F (x1, . . . , xn). Then Fˆ defines a map Fˆ : k¯
nd → k¯d sending (Xˆ) = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn) ∈
k¯nd, with xˆi ∈ k¯
d, to Fˆ (Xˆ).
We have the following commutative diagrams
k¯nd
Fˆ
→ k¯d
↓ δσi ↓ δσi
k¯n
Fσi
→ k¯
k¯nd
Fˆ
−→ k¯d
↓ ρ ↓ ρ
k¯nd
∏d−1
i=0
Fσi
−→ k¯d
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In particular Fˆ = ρ−1 ◦
∏d−1
i=0 F
σi ◦ ρ.
Let R = K[x1, . . . , xn] and Rˆ = k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn]. Suppose V = Z(F1, . . . , Fm),
the algebraic set defined by the zeroes of F1, . . . , Fm ∈ R. The descent Vˆ of V
with respect to u is defined by Vˆ = Z(Fˆ1, . . . , Fˆm).
The map ρ induces an isomorphism Vˆ →
∏d−1
i=0 V
σi . Since u is secret, ρ
is secret as well, so we may consider Vˆ as a blinded version of
∏d−1
i=0 V
σi , and
consider a rational function φ : Vˆ → k¯ as a blinded version of φ′ = φ ◦ ρ−1 :∏d−1
i=0 V
σi → k¯. Suppose α ∈ Vˆ and ρ(α) = (βi)
d−1
i=0 with βi ∈ V
σi . Then α is the
blinded point of (βi)
d−1
i=0 , and (α, φ(α)) is a blinded version of (β, φ
′(β)) where
β = (βi)
d−1
i=0 .
Suppose ϕ : V → k¯ is a rational function defined over K. We denote by ϕˆ
the map ϕˆ = ρ−1 ◦
∏d−1
i=0 ϕ
σi ◦ ρ, and we have the commutative diagram
Vˆ
ϕˆ
−→ k¯d
↓ ρ ↓ ρ∏d−1
i=0 V
σi
∏d−1
i=0
ϕσi
−→ k¯d
We consider the map ϕˆ as a blinded version of
∏d−1
i=0 ϕ
σi . Moreover we note that
ϕσi ◦ δσi = δσi ◦ ϕˆ is a blinded version of pri ◦
∏d−1
j=0 ϕ
σj = ϕσi ◦ pri in the sense
described above, where pri denotes the projection to the i-th coordinate.
For the blinding to be effective we want to maintain the secrecy of u while
we specify Vˆ , and ϕˆ or ϕσi ◦ δσi .
A few observations are in order.
1. For α ∈ Vˆ , if both α and δα are made public, then a linear relation on the
ui is revealed: 〈α,u〉 = δα.
2. In our setting we assume polynomially many points from Vˆ can be sampled.
If both Fˆ and F ◦ δ are specified then for sampled α ∈ Vˆ , let β = Fˆ (α), then
δβ = δFˆ (α) = F ◦ δ(α), hence a a linear relation on ui is revealed from β
and δβ.
3. If F is known and F ◦ δ is specified, then for a sampled α ∈ Vˆ , F ◦ δ(α)
yields linear relation for a set of monomials in u0, . . . , ud−1. Take for example
F = axy, then F ◦ δ(xˆ, yˆ) =
∑
i,j auiujxiyj . If F ◦ δ(α) = b, then we get the
relation b =
∑
i,j aαiαjuiuj on uiuj , where α = (αi)
d−1
i=0 .
Therefore we do not specify both ϕˆ and ϕ◦δ (or ϕσi ◦δσi), and we do not specify
ϕ ◦ δ if ϕ is known to the public.
In the following subsections we investigate more fully what and how descent
algebraic sets and maps can be specified so as to maintain the secrecy of the
descent basis u.
2.1 Global descent
We call (fi)
d−1
i=0 , with fi ∈ k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn], a global descent (with respect to u)
if there is F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] such that Fˆ = (fi)
d−1
i=0 . We call a polynomial
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G ∈ K[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn], a K-global descent for u
σi if there is F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] such
that G = δσi ◦ Fˆ = F σi ◦ δσi .
Lemma 2. Let H = (fi)
d−1
i=0 with fi ∈ k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn]. Then 〈H,u
σi〉 is a K-global
descent for uσi if and only if H is a global descent.
Proof If H is a global descent then H = Fˆ for some F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]. Then
〈H,uσi〉 = 〈Fˆ,uσi〉 = δσi ◦ Fˆ is a K-global descent.
Conversely if 〈H,uσi〉 is aK-global descent, then there is some F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]
such that 〈H,uσi〉 = δσi ◦ Fˆ. Since δσi ◦ Fˆ = 〈Fˆ ,uσi〉, we have 〈H − Fˆ ,uσi〉 = 0.
Since H − Fˆ is fixed by σ, we have 〈H − Fˆ ,uσj〉 = 0 for j = 0, . . . , d− 1. This
implies H = Fˆ , given that ρ is invertible. ✷
Global descents and K-global descents are objects that reveal the identity of
u, as shown in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 below. Consequently they should
not be formed and made public if u is to remain secret.
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 show that whether or not a tuple of poly-
nomials contains any global descent and whether a polynomial contains any
K-global descent can be efficiently checked using the basis u.
Proposition 5 characterizes Gld(k)-action on a global descent, and shows in
particular that for a global descent Fˆ , the fraction of Γ ∈ Gld(k) such that Γ Fˆ
contains any global descent is negligible. These results will be applied in the
next subsection to show how descent maps on nontrivial descent varieties can be
properly specified so as to keep u secret.
We note that implicit in our notation is the assumption that the association
between the variables in xˆi and xi, for all i, is public information.
A term T with coefficient a is of the form am where a is a constant and m
is a monomial. Call a term T vital if it is of degree greater than 1 or of the form
axi where K = k(a).
The support of a polynomial is the set of monomials that appear in the
polynomial with nonzero coefficient.
For a ∈ K, let Γa = (γij) be the d by d matrix in Gld(k) such that aui =∑d
j=1 γijuj . Note that the fraction of Γ ∈ Gld(k) such that Γ = Γ
t
a for some
a ∈ K is in roughly |k|
d
|k|d2
, which is negligible.
Proposition 1. Suppose F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] contains a vital term. Then given
Fˆ one can efficiently uncover the descent basis.
ProofWrite F as the sum of terms F =
∑
Ti. Then Fˆ =
∑
i Tˆi. From Fˆ we can
read off Tˆi easily since Tˆi have disjoint supports, each determined completely by
the corresponding monomial in Ti. So it is enough to consider the case where F
is a vital term T .
Suppose F = T is a vital term and for simplicity suppose T = ax1 . . . xr for
some r ≥ 1, where either r > 1 or r = 1 and K = k(a). Below we discuss how
u1, . . . , ud can be uncovered from Tˆ .
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Suppose T˜ =
∑d
i=1 hiui. Set b = au2 . . . ur if r > 1. Then
b˜x1 =
d∑
i=1
hi(xˆ1, uˆ2, . . . , uˆr)ui,
where uˆi = (0, . . . , 1, 0 . . . , 0) ∈ k
d consists of all 0 except that the i-th coordinate
is 1. So b̂x1 can be obtained from Tˆ . It is likely that b generates K over k, in
which case from b̂uj, j = 1, . . . , d, we compute the irreducible polynomial for b,
and determine b up to Galois conjugates.
Evaluating b̂x1 at xˆ1 = b̂uj we obtain b̂2uj . Iterating we obtain b̂iuj for
i = 1, . . . , d−1. From these and the irreducible polynomial of b we can determine
uj as a polynomial expression in b. In this fashion the basis u1, . . . , ud can be
uncovered. ✷
Proposition 2. Given a non-constant K-global descent one can efficiently un-
cover the descent basis up to a constant factor in K and a Galois conjugate.
Proof Let G = F σi ◦ δσi be a non-constant K-global descent for uσi with F ∈
K[x1, . . . , xn]. The proof is similar for all i so assume without loss of generality
i = 0.
Write F as the sum of terms F =
∑
Ti where Ti = aimi with ai ∈ K and
mi is a monomial in x1, . . . .xn. Then F ◦ δ =
∑
i aimi ◦ δ. From G we can read
off aimi ◦ δ easily since supp(mi ◦ δ) ⊂ suppmˆi, and suppmˆi are all disjoint. So
it is enough to consider the case where F is a non-constant term T .
Suppose for simplicity T = am where m = x1 . . . xr for some r ≥ 1. Below
we discuss how u1, . . . , ud can be uncovered from Tˆ .
We have G = a〈mˆ,u〉 = aδxˆ1 . . . δxˆr. Let uˆi = (0, . . . , 1, 0 . . . , 0) ∈ k
d con-
sists of all 0 except that the i-th coordinate is 1. Then δuˆi = ui. Substituting uˆi
for xˆi in G for i = 1, . . . , r we obtain a polynomial h(xˆ1) = au2 . . . urδxˆ1 = bδxˆ1
where b = au2 . . . ur. Evaluating h at uˆi we get bui for i = 0, . . . , d − 1. Hence
we can determine ui/u0, i = 0, . . . , d− 1.
We remark that if G = F ◦ δσi for i > 0, then by a similar argument we can
determine uσij /u
σi
0 , j = 0, . . . , d− 1. ✷
Consider a d-tuple of polynomials (fi)
d−1
i=0 with fi ∈ k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn]. From the
terms of the d polynomials we can determine a set of monomials m1, . . . ,mt in
R so that the support of each fi is contained in the union of the supports of
mˆ1, . . . , mˆt. Write fi =
∑t
j=1 f
(j)
i where the support of f
(j)
i is contained in the
support of mˆj , so that (fi)
d−1
i=0 =
∑t
j=1(f
(j)
i )
d−1
i=0 .
We say that (fi)
d−1
i=0 contains a global descent if there is some j such that
(f
(j)
i )
d−1
i=0 = âjmj
for some aj ∈ K.
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Proposition 3. Given (fi)
d−1
i=0 with fi ∈ k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn] and the descent basis,
one can efficiently check if (fi)
d−1
i=0 contains a global descent.
Proof From the above discussion we are reduced to the case where there is a
monomial m such that suppfi ⊂ suppmˆ for all i. The question is whether there
is some a ∈ K such that
∑
i fiui = a〈mˆ,u〉. This is easy to determine once we
have computed
∑
i fiui and 〈mˆ,u〉. ✷
Let G ∈ K[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn]. Let θ : θ0, . . . , θ
d−1 be a public basis of K/k. Then G
can be expressed in the form G =
∑d−1
i=0 giθi where gi ∈ k[x1, . . . , xn]. By Propo-
sition 3 we can check efficiently whether (gi)
d−1
i=0 contains any global descent.
Then we can write G =
∑
iGi where suppGi ⊂ suppmˆi for some monomial
mi in x1, . . . , xn, and mi are all distinct.
We say that G contains a K-global descent if there is some i such that Gi
is a K-global descent. That is to say Gi = a〈mˆi,u
σj〉 for some a ∈ K and
0 ≤ j ≤ d − 1. By computing 〈mˆi,u
σj〉 we can determine if G = a〈mˆi,u
σj〉 for
some a ∈ K.
Therefore we have the following.
Proposition 4. Given G ∈ K[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn], i and u, one can efficiently check if
G contains a K-global descent for uσi , and whether Gˆθ = (gi)
d−1
i=0 contains any
global descent, where gi ∈ k[x1, . . . , xn] and G =
∑d−1
i=0 giθi = 〈Gˆθ, θ〉.
Proposition 5. Suppose F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] and Γ ∈ Gld(k). If Γ Fˆ contains the
global descent of a nonconstant term, then Γ = Γa for some a ∈ K. If Γ Fˆ = Gˆ
for some G ∈ R. Then G = aF for some a ∈ K and Γ = Γ ta. Consequently, the
fraction of Γ ∈ Gld(k) such that Γ Fˆ contains a global descent of a nonconstant
term is negligible.
Proof Consider a non-constant term T ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]. Suppose T˜ =
∑d
i=1 fiui.
Then for a ∈ K,
a˜T =
d∑
i=1
fiaui =
∑
j
∑
i
fiγijuj
where Γa = (γij). Hence
âT = Γ taTˆ .
For a ∈ K there is a unique b ∈ kd such that δb = 〈b,u〉 = a. We denote such
b as aˆ. It is easy to see that {Tˆ (αˆ) : α ∈ Kn} contains d linearly independent
vectors since T̂ (α) = Tˆ (αˆ). Hence for Γ ∈ Gld(k), Γ Tˆ = Tˆ if and only if Γ is
the identity matrix. It follows that Γ Tˆ = âT if and only if Γ = Γ ta.
Now let F =
∑
i Ti where Ti is a term. Let Γ ∈ Gld(k). Then Fˆ =
∑
i Tˆi and
Γ Fˆ =
∑
i Γ Tˆi. If Γ Fˆ contains a nontrivial global descent, then Γ Tˆi is a global
descent for some i where Ti is a non-constant term. This implies Γ Tˆi = âT for
some a ∈ K. It follows that Γ = Γ ta.
In particular if Γ Fˆ = Gˆ then G = aF for some a ∈ K and Γ = Γa. ✷
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2.2 Specifying polynomial maps on descent varieties
Throughout this subsection let R = K[x1, . . . , xn] and Rˆ = k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn]. Sup-
pose V = Z(F1, . . . , Fm), the algebraic set defined by the zeroes of F1, . . . , Fm ∈
R. Assume that F1, . . . ,Fm are public. We have Vˆ = Z(Fˆ1, . . . , Fˆm). However to
specify Vˆ , Fˆi should not be used, otherwise u may be uncovered, if Fˆi contains
a vital term. We choose random Γi ∈ Gld(k) in secret, and check using Propo-
sition 5 that ΓiFˆi does not contain any global descent. Let ΓiFˆi = (gij)
d−1
j=0 for
i = 1, . . . ,m. Then Vˆ can be specified as the zero set of {gij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤
j ≤ d− 1}. We have the following
Proposition 6. Given V = Z(F1, . . . , Fm) one can efficiently construct gij ∈
Rˆ, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1, such that Vˆ is the zero set of {gij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤
j ≤ d − 1}, (gij)
d−1
j=0 contains no global descent and ΓiFˆi = (gij)
d−1
j=0 for some
random secret Γi ∈ Gld(k), for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Suppose a map ϕ : V (k¯)→ k¯ can be defined by the restriction of a polynomial
H ∈ R to V . Then ϕˆ can be defined by the restriction of Hˆ = (hi)
d−1
i=0 to Vˆ ,
with hi ∈ Rˆ with coefficients in k. However by Proposition 1, if H has a vital
term then the global descent (hi)
d−1
i=0 can be used to uncover the descent basis.
Therefore we cannot specify ϕˆ by (hi)
d−1
i=0 . Instead we will specify ϕˆ by some
(h′i)
d−1
i=0 where h
′
i = hi + gi with gi ∈ Rˆ and gi vanishes on Vˆ , so that (h
′
i)
d−1
i=0
contains no global descent. Simply put we want h′i = hi mod I(Vˆ ) such that
(h′i)
d−1
i=0 contains no global descent.
Similarly the map ϕσi ◦ δσi : Vˆ (k¯) → k¯ can be defined by the restriction of
the K-global descent Hσi ◦ δσi to Vˆ . We need to modify Hσi ◦ δσi by adding
a polynomial in I(Vˆ ) such that the resulting polynomial dose not contain any
K-global descent.
The following propositions addresses this issue. In the propositions we need
the following assumption: Given any nontrivial monomial m we can efficiently
form a polynomial F that vanishes on V such that m appears in F with nonzero
constant b.
The assumption is satisfied for example if V = Z(F1, . . . , Fm) where F1 has
a nonzero constant term. Then we can take F = b′miF1 with random nonzero
b′ ∈ K. The assumption is easy to satisfy by a linear change of coordinates. For
simplicity we also assume the degrees of F1, ..., Fm are bounded, as is applicable
to our setting of trilinear map construction. However we remark that the the
next proposition holds when Fi and H are of degrees polynomially bounded.
Proposition 7. Given H = (fi)
d−1
i=0 with fi ∈ Rˆ of degree bounded by O(1),
and A ∈ Gld(k), we can efficiently construct f
′
i , i = 0, . . . , d − 1, such that
f ′i = fi mod I(Vˆ ) and the probability that A
t(f ′i)
d−1
i=0 contains a global descent
is negligible.
Proof Write H =
∑
iHi where suppHi ⊂ mˆi, the mi are distinct monomials
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in R. Let ∆ be a vector of d zero polynomials initially. For each Hi, we apply
the following procedure. If Hi = Tˆ where T = aimi with ai ∈ K, then choose
a polynomial F that vanishes on V such that mi appears in F with nonzero
constant b. Let Γ be randomly chosen from Gld(k). Then ∆ is replaced by
∆+ Γ Fˆ
After the above procedure is applied to all Hi, we obtain some H + ∆ =
(h′i)
d
i=1 with h
′
i ∈ Rˆ and h
′
i = hi mod I(Vˆ ). Moreover we have (h
′
i)
d
i=1 =
∑
iH
′
i
where H ′i ∈ Rˆ
d, and each H ′i is of the form H
′
i = Gi +
∑
j Γijmˆi where mi is
a monomial, Gi ie either 0 or Gi = Hi, suppHi ⊂ suppmˆi, and Γij are random
elements in Gld(k). Let A ∈ Gld(k). If A
tH ′i = âmi for some a ∈ K, then
AtGi +A
t(
∑
j Γij)mˆi = Γ
t
amˆi for some a ∈ K. Hence Gi = Bmˆi where B is in
the additive group generated by Gld(k). However when Gi = Bmˆi where B is in
the additive group generated by Gld(k), it is unlikely A
t(B +
∑
j Γij) = Γ
t
a for
some a ∈ K with random Γij . Consequently it is unlikely that A
tH ′i = âmi for
some a ∈ K. ✷
2.3 Specifying rational maps on descent varieties
We keep the same notation as before, but suppose now the map ϕ : V (k¯) → k¯
can be defined by the restriction of a rational function F/G to V where F,G ∈ R.
Then ϕˆ : Vˆ → k¯d is the descent map defined by ϕˆ = ρ−1 ◦
∏d−1
i=0 ϕ
σi ◦ρ. We have
δσi ◦ ϕˆ = ϕσi ◦ δσi , or more explicitly,
〈ϕˆ(xˆ),uσi〉 = ϕσi(δσi xˆ)
for all xˆ ∈ Vˆ (k¯).
Lemma 3. Let F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn], and a ∈ K
∗ and i ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}. Then
1. 〈âF ,uσi〉 = aσi〈Fˆ,uσi〉.
2. âF = AtFˆ where A ∈ Gld(k) such that au = Au.
Proof
〈âF ,uσi〉 = (aF)σi ◦ δσi = aσi(Fσi ◦ δσi) = aσi〈Fˆ,uσi〉.
Hence the first assertion. Since A is fixed by σ, au = Au implies aσiuσi = Auσi .
aσi〈Fˆ ,uσi〉 = 〈Fˆ, aσiuσi〉 = 〈Fˆ,Auσi〉 = 〈AtFˆ,uσi〉.
Hence the second assertion, given that ρ is invertible.. ✷
For i = 0, . . . , d−1 let Γθ,i denote the matrix in Gld(k) such that u
σi = Γθ,iθ.
For a ∈ K, let Γθ,a denote the matrix in Gld(k) such that au = Γθ,aθ.
Lemma 4. For a ∈ K and i = 0, . . . , d− 1
a〈xˆ,uσi〉 = 〈Γtθ,aΓ
t
θ,ixˆ, θ〉
for all xˆ ∈ k¯d.
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Proof
a〈xˆ,uσi〉 = a〈xˆ,Γθ,iθ〉 = a〈Γ
t
θ,ixˆ, θ〉 = 〈Γ
t
θ,ixˆ, aθ〉 = 〈Γ
t
θ,ixˆ,Γθ,aθ〉 = 〈Γ
t
θ,aΓ
t
θ,ixˆ, θ〉
✷
Proposition 8. Suppose ϕ(x) = F (x)/G(x) for all x ∈ V (k¯). Then for a ∈ K
and i = . . . , d− 1, the following holds.
1. For all r ∈ K∗,
aϕσi(δσi xˆ) =
F σi1 ◦ δ
σi
Gσi1 ◦ δ
σi
=
〈Fˆ1,u
σi〉
〈Gˆ1,uσi〉
where F1 = (ar)
σ−iF and G1 = (r)
σ−iG.
2. The function aϕ ◦ δσi on Vˆ can be defined by
∑d−1
i=0
f ′iθi∑d−1
i=0
g′
i
θi
where f ′i , g
′
i ∈
k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn], both (f
′
i) and (g
′
i) contain no global descent and both functions∑d−1
i=0 f
′
iθi and
∑d−1
i=0 g
′
iθi contain no K-global descent.
Proof We have
aϕσi(δσi xˆ) = a
F σi(δσi xˆ)
Gσi (δσi xˆ)
= a
〈Fˆ (xˆ),uσi〉
〈Gˆ(xˆ),uσi〉
=
ar〈Fˆ (xˆ),uσi〉
r〈Gˆ(xˆ),uσi〉
.
Then the first assertion follows from Lemma 3.
Applying Proposition 7 to Fˆ1 we construct efficiently F
′
1, a d-tuple of poly-
nomials in k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn], such that F
′
1 − Fˆ1 is a d-tuple of polynomials in I(Vˆ ),
and Γ tθ,iF
′
1, and A
t
jF
′
1 all contain no global descent for j = 0, . . . , d − 1, where
Aj = Γθ,iΓ
−1
θ,j . Let (f
′
j)
d−1
j=0 = Γ
t
θ,iF
′
1. Then
∑d−1
j=0 f
′
jθj = 〈Fˆ ,u
σi〉 on Vˆ . Moreover,
d−1∑
j=0
f ′jθj = 〈(fj)
d−1
j=0 , θ〉 = 〈Γ
−t
θ,j(fr)
d−1
r=0 ,u
σj〉 = 〈AtjF
′
1,u
σj〉.
Consequently
∑d−1
j=0 f
′
jθj contains no K-global descent for u
σj for all j.
The tuple (g′i) can be constructed similarly by applying Proposition 7 to Gˆ1.
✷
By choosing r ∈ K∗ in Proposition 8 randomly, the coefficient a is blinded.
When aϕσi ◦ δσi is specified in the form
∑
i
f ′iθi∑
i g
′
iθi
as in Proposition 8, we say that
the specification contains no global descent and the coefficient a is blinded.
To specify ϕˆ, we observe that ϕˆ = (ϕˆi)
d−1
i=0 where
ϕˆi(xˆ) =
d−1∑
j=0
wijϕ
σi(δσi xˆ).
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Let hij = wijϕ
σj ◦ δσj . For each i, partition the set {hij : j = 0, . . . , d− 1} into
random disjoint subsets S0, S1,..., where each Sj consists of 2 or 3 functions.
Then ϕˆi =
∑
j ψij , where ψij is the sum of the functions in Sj . The function
hij = wijϕ
σj ◦ δσj can be expressed in the quotient form as in Proposition 8,
so that the expression contains no global descent. As we take the sum of the
functions in Sj and express the resulting function ψij in quotient form again,
we can apply Proposition 7 to modify each tuple of polynomials if necessary
and make sure that the expression, which is to be used to specify ψij , does not
contain any global descent. Therefore we have the following
Proposition 9. To specify ϕˆ = (ϕˆi)
d−1
i=0 , where ϕˆi =
∑
j hij , with hij = wijϕ
σj ◦
δσj , one can specify ϕˆi as
∑
j ψij where ψij is the sum of the functions in Sij.
Each Sij contains 2 or 3 functions and for each i, Sij form a random partition
of {hij : j = 0, . . . , d − 1} into subsets of 2 or 3 elements. Moreover ψij can be
efficiently specified in the form
∑d−1
i=0
f ′iθi∑d−1
i=0
g′
i
θi
where f ′i , g
′
i ∈ k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn], both (f
′
i)
and (g′i) contain no global descent and both functions
∑d−1
i=0 f
′
iθi and
∑d−1
i=0 g
′
iθi
contain no K-global descent.
2.4 Linear analysis
Suppose the descent ϕˆ of a map ϕ : V → V defined over K is specified. Suppose
one point on Vˆ is given. Then starting with the given point, one can repeatedly
apply the descent map ϕˆ to obtain more points on Vˆ . Heuristically speaking we
may consider these points as randomly sampled from Vˆ (k¯).
In this section we investigate the following question: under what conditions
could information about u be efficiently computed from polynomially many sam-
pled points α of Vˆ ?
Similarly, suppose φ : V → k¯ is a rational function defined over K, and
suppose φ is not public but φ ◦ δ : Vˆ → k¯ is specified, so that polynomially
many pairs of (α, φ ◦ δ(α)) can be obtained where α ∈ Vˆ . We also investigate
the following question: under what conditions could information about u be
efficiently computed from polynomially many pairs (α, φ ◦ δ(α)) (even if ϕˆ and
φ ◦ δ are specified properly so that the specifications contain no global descent
and none of the sampled points are descent points)?
We begin with some general consideration and definitions. Suppose S is a
finite set of monomials in variables x1, . . . , xn. Let λS denote the map from
k¯n → k¯|S| such that for α ∈ k¯n, λS(α) is the vector consisting of m(α) where m
ranges over all monomials in S.
ForA ⊂ k¯n, let ℓS(A) be the dimension of the linear space of {F ∈ k¯[x1, . . . , xn] :
suppF ⊂ S, F (α) = 0, ∀α ∈ A}, and let ωS(A) be the maximal number of lin-
early independent λS(α) with α ∈ A.
Let F ∈ k¯[x1, . . . , xn] with suppF ⊂ S. Write F =
∑
m∈S cmm. Then for
α ∈ k¯n, F (α) = 〈cF , λS(α)〉 where cF is the vector consisting of cm with m ∈ S.
Therefore, ℓS(A) + ωS(A) = |S|.
13
If ωS(A) = |S|, then F is the unique polynomial G with support contained
in suppG ⊂ S such that G(α) = F (α) for all α ∈ A. If ωS(A) = |S| − 1, then
there is a unique non-zero polynomial F up to a constant multiple such that
F (α) = 0 for all α ∈ A.
We now consider as before, the situation of an algebraic variety V defined by
a set of polynomials in K[x1, . . . , xn] and its descent Vˆ with respect to a basis
u of K over k. Suppose a set A of polynomially many sampled points on Vˆ is
available.
Suppose S is a set of monomials in x1, . . . , xn. Let Sˆ = ∪m∈Ssuppmˆ. Let
I(V ) be the ideal consisting of polynomials in K[x1, . . . , xn] that vanish at all
points of V . Let IS be the set of polynomials in I(V ) with support bounded
by S. Let LSˆ be the linear space of polynomials in K[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn] with support
bounded by Sˆ that vanish at all the sampled points of Vˆ . Hence ℓSˆ(A) = dimLSˆ .
Lemma 5. Suppose ϕ : Vˆ → k¯ is a map such that there is some F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]
and ϕ can be defined by the restriction of F ◦δ to Vˆ . Let S = suppF . If ℓSˆ(A) = 0
then F ◦ δ is uniquely determined from λSˆ(A) and ϕ(A).
Since F ◦ δ is a K-global descent, it reveals substantial information on u
by Proposition 2. Lemma 5 leads to the following attack. We need to assume
n = O(1). Suppose a map ϕ : Vˆ → k¯ is specified in some way but it can actually
be defined as F ◦ δ for some F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] of bounded degree. Suppose
S = suppF . Since we assume degF is bounded, there are only finitely many
choices for S, hence Sˆ.
Suppose the correct S is being tried. If ℓSˆ(A) = 0, then F ◦ δ is the unique
polynomial with support bounded by Sˆ such that F ◦ δ(α) = ϕ(α) for all α ∈ A.
From ϕ(A) = {ϕ(α) : α ∈ A} and λSˆ(A) the coefficient vector of F ◦ δ can be
determined, hence F ◦ δ is found.
Consider for example when F = x1. Suppose the projection of V to the
x1-coordinate is surjective. Then the projection of Vˆ to the coordinates in xˆ1
is also surjective. We have suppF = {x1}. In this situation it is likely that
ωSˆ(A) = d = |Sˆ|, and the attack described above can be mounted.
The attack can be avoided if we make sure that whenever some ϕ : Vˆ → k¯
is specified and ϕ can be defined as the restriction of F ◦ δ on Vˆ , IS 6= 0 where
S = suppF . More precisely suppose h ∈ IS . Then supphˆ ⊂ Sˆ, so ℓSˆ(A) > 0.
Letting hˆ = (hi)
d−1
i=0 , we know that F ◦δ+
∑
aihi defines the same function on Vˆ
for all ai ∈ K. Moreover supphˆ ⊂ suppFˆ = suppF ◦ δ. It follows from Lemma 2
and Proposition 5 that for random choices of ai, the probability that
∑
i aihi is
a K-global descent is negligible, hence the probability that F ◦ δ +
∑
aihi is a
K-global descent is negligible. We have the following:
Lemma 6. Let F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] with S = suppF . Suppose IS 6= 0. Let h ∈ IS
with hˆ = (hi)
d−1
i=0 . Then F ◦ δ +
∑
aihi defines the same function on Vˆ for all
ai ∈ K. Moreover for random choices of ai, the probability that F ◦ δ +
∑
aihi
is a K-global descent is negligible.
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The attack described below, linear-term attack, though very limited in scope
of success, helps identify some relatively weak cases, such as when V is contained
in a hyperplane, or when V is defined by a single polynomial with a linear term.
Lemma 7. Suppose there is some F ∈ I(V ) with a linear term xi and ℓSˆ(A) = d
where S = suppF . Then from S and A, the set of sampled points, Fˆ can be
uncovered efficiently.
Proof Since S = suppF , the polynomials in Fˆ all have support contained in
Sˆ. Suppose without loss of generality F = x1 + F1 where x1 6∈ suppF1. Then
Fˆ = xˆ1+ Fˆ1. If we put Fˆ = (fi)
d−1
i=0 then fi = x1i+gi where Fˆ1 = (gi)
d−1
i=0 . So x1j
is not in suppgi for j 6= i. It follows that f0, . . . , fd−1 are linearly independent.
If ℓSˆ(A) = d, then f0, . . . , fd−1 form a linear basis for the linear space L of
polynomials G with support bounded by Sˆ such that 〈CG, λSˆ(α)〉 = 0 for all
α ∈ A where CG denotes the coefficient vector of G. Moreover fi can be found
by solving for f ∈ L such that the coefficient of f in x1i = 1 and the coefficient
of f in x1j = 0 for j 6= i. ✷
Example 1 Suppose V is contained in a hyperplane defined by a linear poly-
nomial H . Let S = suppH . Then dimLSˆ ≥ d, and LSˆ contains all the linear
polynomials in Hˆ . If dimLSˆ = d then Hˆ can be determined from S and the
sampled points by Lemma 7.
Example 2 Let V be the affine part of the elliptic curve defined by y2 =
x3 + ax + b. Consider S = {y2, x3, x, 1}, and F = a−1(y2 − x3 − ax − b). If
dimLSˆ = d then Fˆ can be can be determined from S and the sampled points by
Lemma 7. The situation is similar if V is defined by a polynomial that contains
a linear term.
Suppose F ∈ I(V ) with a linear term xi. To prevent linear-term attack to
discover Fˆ , it is sufficient if IS′ 6= 0 where S
′ = S − {xi} and S = suppF .
Suppose h ∈ IS′ . Let hˆ = (hi)
d−1
i=0 . Then hi ∈ LSˆ′ ⊂ LSˆ for all i. It follows that
dimLSˆ > d. To summarize we have the following:
Lemma 8. Suppose F ∈ I(V ) with a linear term xi. Let S = suppF . If IS′ 6= 0
where S′ = S − {xi}, then ℓSˆ(A) > d.
2.5 Choosing a birational model to prevent linear attacks
To prevent the linear attacks described in the previous subsection, we can form
V ′ birational to V over K such that conditions preventing the attacks as de-
scribed in Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 can be easily satisfied.
Consider a rational map λ : k¯n → k¯n+1 sending (x1, . . . , xn) to (x1, . . . , xn, xn+1)
where ∑
1≤i<j≤n
aijxixj + xn+1
n∑
i=1
bixi = 0
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where aij ∈ K for all i, j and bi ∈ K for all i. The map λ is injective where∑n
i=1 bixi 6= 0. We assume bi are randomly chosen from K, so that with high
probability no sampled points lie on the exceptional hyperplane
∑n
i=1 bixi = 0 .
Consider a random general linear map µ : k¯n+1 → k¯n+1 given by an n + 1
by n + 1 invertible matrix over B over K. Let L1,...Ln+1 be linear forms in
x1, . . . , xn+1 such that letting x = (x1, . . . , xn+1), then µ
−1(x) = (Li(x))
n+1
i=1 .
Let V be an algebraic variety defined by a set of polynomials F1, . . . , Fm in
K[x1, . . . , xn] as before. Let V
′ = µ(λ(V )), the image of V under ι = µ◦λ. Then
ι : V → V ′ isK-birational and V ′ is the zero set of F ′i (x) = Fi(L1(x), . . . , Ln(x)),
i = 1, . . . ,m, and R′ =
∑
1≤i<j≤n aijLi(x)Lj(x) + Ln+1(x)
∑n
i=1 biLi(x).
Note that LiLj likely involves all xrxs with randomly chosen µ, and more gen-
erally, Li1 . . . Lis likely involves all monomials in x1, . . . , xn+1 of degree s. Sup-
pose F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]. Then F (L1(x), . . . , Ln(x)) is likely dense in x1, . . . , xn+1.
This is useful in preventing the attacks described in Lemma 5 and Lemma 7 as
we explain below.
We assume that I(V ) does not contain any linear polynomial. In forming V ′
we assume that with randomly chosen µ that every polynomial in the defining
set of V ′ is dense at least for some degree i > 1, in the sense that the support of
the polynomial contains all monomials in x1, . . . , xn+1 of degree i. Let I
′ = I(V ′)
and I ′S denote the subset of I
′ with support bounded by S where S is a set of
monomials in x1, . . . , xn+1. If S contains all monomials of degree i for some i ≥ 2,
then I ′S 6= 0 as it contains for example R
′xi−21 . Hence the attack in Lemma 7
can be prevented if every polynomial in I ′ of bounded degree with a linear term
is dense for some degree at least 2.
Suppose ϕ : V → k¯ is a K-rational function that can be defined by F/G on V
where F,G ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] both of degree at least 2. Then on V
′ the correspond-
ing map ϕ′ = ϕ ◦ ι−1 can be defined by F ′/G′ with F ′, G′ ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn+1]
where F ′ = F (L1(x), . . . , Ln(x)) and G
′ = G(L1(x), . . . , Ln(x)), and both F
′
and G′ are likely dense. Suppose F ′ (resp. G′) is dense for degree i ≥ 2. Then
I ′S 6= 0 where S = suppF
′ (resp. S = suppG′). Hence the attack in Lemma 5
can be prevented when ϕ′ ◦ δ is specified by specifying F ′ ◦ δ and G′ ◦ δ.
Suppose ϕ : V → V is a K-rational map. The map ι ◦ϕ : V → V ′ consists of
n + 1 rational functions ψ1,...,ψn+1. Suppose ψi can be defined by Fi/Gi with
Fi, Gi ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]. Then ϕ
′ = ι ◦ ϕ ◦ ι−1 : V ′ → V ′ can be defined by
ψ′i = F
′
i /G
′
i where F
′
i = Fi(L1(x), . . . , Ln(x)) and G
′
i = Gi(L1(x), . . . , Ln(x))
for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1. Similarly, if F ′i and G
′
i are dense in some degree at least 2,
then the attack in Lemma 5 can be prevented when F ′i ◦ δ and G
′
i ◦ δ (and their
Galois conjugates) are specified in order to specify ϕˆ′.
In our situation there will be a finite set of polynomials involved in defining
various rational functions on V that are of interest to trilinear map construction.
By choosing random µ we check and make sure that every such polynomial F is
such that the corresponding F ′ = F (L1(x), . . . , Ln(x)) is dense for some degree
i ≥ 2.
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2.6 Summary on specification of descent maps and functions
We now summarize our discussion from § 2.1 to § 2.5.
We say that an algebraic set V defined over K is safe (for specification of the
descent of V ) if the following holds: (1) I(V ) contains no linear polynomial, and
(2) if F ∈ I(V ) contains a linear term xi then IS 6= 0 where S = suppF − {xi}.
Condition (1) is easy to satisfy unless V is a linear variety. Condition (2) is
likely to hold after a random birational transformation as described in § 2.5.
These conditions prevent the linear-term attack described in Lemma 7 using the
sampled points on Vˆ .
For F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn], let SF be the support of F . We say that F is safe
if ISF 6= 0. When F is safe the linear attack (Lemma 5) does not apply when
F σi ◦ δσi is specified (Lemma 6).
A rational function ϕ : V → k¯ defined overK is safe if for F,G ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]
such that ϕ can be defined by F/G on V , F and G are safe.
When a random birational transformation ι as described in § 2.5 is applied
to V , the rational function ϕ ◦ ι−1 which replaces ϕ is likely safe if ϕ is defined
as the quotient of two polynomials of degree at least 2.
The specification of descent maps and descent functions with blinding mul-
tiples (ϕˆ and aϕσi ◦ δσi) all boil down to specifying functions on Vˆ → k¯ of the
form rF σi ◦ δσi where r is secret random and F ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] may be known.
By Proposition 8, rF σi ◦δσi can be specified as
∑d−1
i=0 fiθi with fi ∈ k[xˆ1, . . . , xˆn]
such that (fi)
d−1
i=0 contains no global descent and
∑d−1
i=0 fiθi contains no K-global
descent. We say that rF σi ◦ δσi is properly specified (as
∑d−1
i=0 fiθi).
The map aϕσi ◦ δσi is specified once we specify arF σi ◦ δσi and rGσi ◦ δσi
where r ∈ K∗ is secret and randomly chosen. We say that aϕσi ◦ δσi is properly
specified if arF σi ◦ δσi and rGσi ◦ δσi are properly specified, where r ∈ K∗ is
secret and randomly chosen, such that ϕ = F/G on V , we say that a is blinded
in the specification.
When the descent map ϕˆ is specified in the manner as described in Proposi-
tion 9, we say that it is properly specified.
2.7 Mixed descent
Let ϕ : V ×V → k¯ be a rational function that can be defined by F (x, y)/G(x, y)
where F and G are polynomials in x = x1, . . . , xn and y = y1, . . . , yn. We now
consider descent function determined by ϕ on Vˆ ×Vˆ ′ where Vˆ and Vˆ ′ are descent
varieties of V formed with respect two different secret bases. We discuss how the
method for properly specifying descent functions can be naturally adapted to
this situation.
In this setting, we fix a public basis θ1, . . . , θd of K/k, a private basis u =
u0, . . . ,ud−1 of K/k, and another private basis u
′ = u′0, . . . ,u
′
d−1 of K/k.
Let δ denote the basic descent map k¯d → k¯ with respect to u, and ρ the
bijective linear map k¯d → k¯d determined by δ.
Let δ′ denote the basic descent map k¯d → k¯ with respect to u′, and ρ′ the
bijective linear map k¯d → k¯d determined by δ′.
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Let Vˆ denote the descent of V with respect to the basis u.
Let Vˆ ′ denote the descent of V with respect to the basis u′.
Suppose A is the set of sampled points on Vˆ and A′ is the set of sampled
points on Vˆ ′.
Then ϕ ◦ (δσi , δ′σi) is a descent function Vˆ × Vˆ ′ → k¯ that can be defined by
F ′/G′ where F ′ = F σi(δσi xˆ, δ′
σi yˆ) and G′ = Gσi(δσi xˆ, δ′
σi yˆ).
We say that a polynomial F (x, y) is safe if IS1(F ) 6= 0 where S1(F ) is the
support of F (x, y) as a polynomial in x, and IS2(F ) 6= 0 where S2(F ) is the
support of F (x, y) as a polynomial in y.
Suppose F is safe. We expect F (x, δ′β) to be safe for randomly sampled β
from Vˆ ′. Similarly we expect F (δα, y) to be safe for randomly sampled α from
Vˆ .
We say a rational function ϕ : V × V → k¯ defined over K is safe, if for
F,G ∈ K[x, y] such that ϕ can be defined by F/G on V × V , both F and G are
safe.
Performing a birational transformation as in § 2.5 if necessary we may assume
F and G are dense in both x and y, hence the above conditions are likely to hold
for F and G of degree at least 2 in x and in y.
We discuss how F ′ can be properly specified as a function Vˆ × Vˆ ′ → k¯.
The method can also be applied to G′. We consider the case F ′ = F (δxˆ, δyˆ)
in the discussion below. The general case F ′ = F σi(δσi xˆ, δ′
σi yˆ) can be treated
in a similar fashion. So suppose F (x, y) =
∑
i aimim
′
i where ai ∈ K
∗, mi is
a monomial in x = x1, . . . , xn and m
′
i is a monomial in y = y1, . . . , yn. Then
F ′(xˆ, yˆ) = F (δxˆ, δyˆ) =
∑
i aimi(δxˆ)m
′
i(δ
′yˆ), a mixed K-global descent with re-
spect to u and u′. From this form of F ′ one easily obtains aimi(δxˆ)m
′
i(δ
′yˆ), from
which essential information on u may be obtained by specializing yˆ to random
β ∈ A′, similarly essential information on u′ may be obtained by specializing xˆ
to random α ∈ A. So in specifying the function on Vˆ × Vˆ ′ we want to modify
F ′ into some H where H − F ′ vanishes on Vˆ × Vˆ ′ and H does not contain any
K-global descent with respect to u or u′ even after specialization at sampled
points. This can be achieved by adapting the method described in the proof of
Proposition 7.
Let F ′ =
∑
i aimi(δxˆ)m
′
i(δ
′yˆ) =
∑
iMiM
′
i where Mi = 〈A
t
imˆi,u〉 with Ai =
Γar−1 with r ∈ K
∗ being randomly chosen and Γar−1u = ar
−1u, and M ′i =
〈Btimˆ
′
i,u
′〉 with Bi = Γ
′
r and Γ
′
ru
′ = ru′.
As in Proposition 7 we find polynomials Fi(x) ∈ I(V ) containing a term mi
and F ′i (y) ∈ I(V ) containing a term m
′
i. We modify the polynomial
∑
iMiM
′
i
to
∑
iHiH
′
i where
Hi =Mi + 〈Γ
tFˆi,u〉,
H ′i =M
′
i + 〈Γ
′tFˆ ′i,u〉
with randomly chosen Γ, Γ ′ ∈ Gld(k).
After the modification the polynomial takes the form
∑
iNiN
′
i with Ni =
〈Γ ti mˆi,u〉 wheremi is a monomial in x, Γi is a random sum of matrices in Gld(k)
except for at most one matrix of the form Γa where a ∈ K
∗ and Γau = au. Hence
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Γi is most likely not of the form Γb for some b ∈ K
∗, in which case Ni is not a
K-global descent with respect to u. Similarly Ni is unlikely a K-global descent
with respect to uσj and u′
σj for j = 0, . . . , d − 1. For example, u = Aju
′σj for
some Aj ∈ Gld(k), and Ni = 〈A
t
jΓ
t
i mˆi,u
′σj 〉. It is unlikely AtjΓ
t
i = Γ
′
b for some
b ∈ K∗ where bu′ = Γ′bu
′.
For a similar reason N ′i is most likely not a K-global descent with respect to
uσj and u′
σj for j = 0, . . . , d− 1. .
We have proved the following:
Proposition 10. Suppose F (x, y) ∈ K[x, y] with x = x1, . . . , xn and y =
y1, . . . , yn. For i = 0, . . . , d − 1, we can efficiently construct G(xˆ, yˆ) ∈ K[xˆ, yˆ]
such that G(xˆ, yˆ) = F σi(δσi xˆ, δ′
σi yˆ) for all (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Vˆ × Vˆ ′, and G is of the
form
∑
iNiN
′
i with Ni = 〈Γ
t
i mˆi,u〉 where mi is a monomial in x, Γi is a d by d
matrix with entries in k and Ni is not a K-global descent with respect to u
σj and
u′
σj for j = 0, . . . , d − 1. Similarly N ′i = 〈Γ
′t
imˆ
′
i,u
′〉 where m′i is a monomial
in y, Γ ′i is a d by d matrix with entries in k and N
′
i is not a K-global descent
with respect to uσj and u′
σj for j = 0, . . . , d− 1.
We say that the descent function F σi ◦(δσi , δ′
σi) in Proposition 10 is properly
specified by G. Note that when G =
∑
iNiN
′
i is specified, Ni is specified in the
public basis θ, that is, Ni =
∑d−1
j=0 fijθj where fij is a polynomial in x1, . . . , xn
with coefficients in k and suppfij ⊂ suppmˆi. Similar observation applies to N
′
i .
With specialization at β ∈ Vˆ ′, G(xˆ, δβ) =
∑
iNiN
′
i(δβ) takes the form∑
j〈A
t
jmˆj ,u〉 where Aj is a heuristically random sum of matrices in Gld(k),
hence 〈Atjmˆj ,u〉 is unlikely a global K-global descent with respect to u. Similar
observation can be made concerning specialization at α ∈ Vˆ .
2.8 Blinding by Weil descent
In this subsection we develop a method for blinding maps using Weil descent, to
be employed later in our trilinear map construction. Let V ⊂ k¯n be an algebraic
set defined as the zero set Z(S) of a finite set S of polynomials in K[x1, . . . , xn].
Let Vˆ ⊂ k¯nd be the descent of V , defined as the zero set Z(Sˆ) where Sˆ contains
all polynomials in Fˆ for every F ∈ S.
Suppose m : V × V → V is a rational map defined over K. Let M be a
d× d (0, 1)-matrix such that each row has at most two nonzero entries, that is,
entries with 1. For row i, let i1 and i2 be such that 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ d − 1 and
M(i, i1) =M(i, i2) = 1.
Let ϕ : V d → V d be a map determined by M as follows. Let X = (Xi)
d−1
i=0
with Xi ∈ V (k¯) ⊂ k¯
n,
ϕ(X) = (ϕi(X))
d−1
i=0
where
ϕi(X) = m(Xi1 , Xi2)
for i = 0, . . . , d− 1.
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Let λ : Vˆ (K) → V d(K) be such that λ = (
∏d−1
i=1 σ−i) ◦ ρ. Let Xˆ ∈ Vˆ (K) ⊂
Knd. Then, λ(Xˆ) = (λi(Xˆ))
d−1
i=0 where λi = σ−i ◦ δ
σi .
Let Ψ : Vˆ (K) → Vˆ (K) be such that Ψ = λ−1 ◦ ϕ ◦ λ. We say that the map
ϕ is blinded by Ψ with respect to u.
We have the following commutative diagram:
Vˆ (K)
ρ
→
∏
i V
σi(K)
∏
i
σ−i
→ V (K)d
↓ Ψ ↓ ϕ
Vˆ (K)
ρ
→
∏
i V
σi(K)
∏
i
σ−i
→ V (K)d
Let A = (aij)0≤i,j≤d−1 be a d by d matrix. For I ⊂ {0, . . . , d − 1}, let
AI = (aij)0≤i≤d−1,j∈I , and AI = (aij)i∈I,0≤j≤d−1.
Suppose A and B are two d by d matrices. If I = {i}, then AIBI =
(crs)0≤r,s≤d−1 with crs = aribis, the tensor product of the i-th column of A
and the i-th row of B. In general, AIBI =
∑
i∈I C(i) where C(i) is the tensor
product of the i-th column of A and the i-th row of B.
Let E = {(i− i1 mod d, i − i2 mod d : i = 0, . . . , d− 1}. For (a, b) ∈ E, let
Ia,b = {i : (i− i1, i− i2) = (a, b) mod d}.
Let Ωa,b =W
Ia,bΓIa,b , and Ωr,a,b be the r-th row of W
Ia,bΓIa,b .
We assume
– u is secret (so are Γ and W ),
– ϕ is secret (so is {(i, i1, i2) : i = 0, . . . , d− 1}),
– mˆ is public.
Proposition 11.
Ψr(Xˆ) =
∑
(a,b)∈E
〈mˆ(Xˆq
a
, Xˆq
b
), Ωr,a,b〉
Consequently, Ψ can be specified to the public by specifying mˆ, and making public
E, and Ωa,b for every (a, b) ∈ E.
Proof For Xˆ ∈ Vˆ (K), Ψ(Xˆ) = (Ψi(Xˆ))
d−1
i=0 where
Ψr(Xˆ) =
d−1∑
i=0
wrim
σi(δσiXˆσi−i1 , δσiXˆσi−i1 )
=
d−1∑
i=0
wri〈mˆ(Xˆ
σi−i1 , Xˆσi−i2 ),uσi 〉
since
mσi(δσiXˆ, δσi Yˆ ) = 〈mˆ(Xˆ, Yˆ ),uσi〉.
Hence
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Ψr(Xˆ) =
∑
(a,b)∈E
〈mˆ(Xˆq
a
, Xˆq
b
), Ωr,a,b〉
where
Ωr,a,b =
∑
i∈Ia,b
wriu
σi
which is the r-th row of Ωa,b =W
Ia,bΓIa,b . ✷
Some observations
1. If |Ia,b| = 1, then u
σi can be determined up to constant factors (though i is
not known), then U/u0 can be determined. Therefore to keep u secret, |Ia,b|
should be greater than.
2. If |Ia,b| = 2 then for each of O(d
2) possible choices of Ia,b we are led to a
system of d2 quadratic equations in 4d unknown. Similarly if 1 < |Ia,b| =
O(1) then for each of dO(1) possible choices of Ia,b we are led to a system of
d2 quadratic equations in O(d) unknown. Solving such systems is difficult in
general.
3. If |Ia,b| is big, say |Ia,b| = o(d
c) for some positive constant c < 1, exhaustively
trying all possible choices of Ia,b is too costly.
Suppose dO(1) many maps like ϕ are blinded with respect to u. We are led
to the following:
Problem: A basis u of K over k is hidden. As before let Γ be the matrix whose
i-th row is uσi for i = 0, . . . , d − 1. Let W = Γ−1. A set of dO(1) matrixes is
given, each of which is W IΓI for some secret I ⊂ {0, . . . , d− 1} with |I| = Θ(d
c)
for some positive constant c < 1. Can u be determined efficiently?
2.9 Specifying maps on abelian varieties
A semi-algebraic set defined over K in k¯n is of the form V (F1, . . . , Fm) −
V (G1, . . . , Gr) where Fi, Gj ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] for all i, j. We may assume that
an abelian variety A can be described in terms of affine pieces. As we will see in
§ 5 when we take A to be the Jacobian variety of a hyperelliptic curve, we may
assume A(k¯) = ∪iVi as a disjoint union, withe each Vi an algebraic subset of k¯
n
for some n. Moreover there is a unique Vi, say i = 0, with dimV0 = dimA. We
call V0 the principal site for A.
The addition morphismm on Vi×Vj can be described in terms of a collection
maps mα : Uα → A where Uα is a semi-algebraic subset of Vi × Vj , and there is
a unique α such that Uα is of the same dimension as Vi × Vj , which we call the
principal site for m on Vi×Vj . The principal site for m on V0×V0 is the unique
site of the same dimension as A×A, and is called the principal site for m.
Similarly, the doubling morphism, sending P ∈ A(k¯) to 2P , has a principal
site on Vi for all i, and the principal site for the doubling morphism on V0 is
called the principal site for the morphism.
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A point Pˆ ∈ Aˆ(k¯) is said to be in a pure site of Aˆ if there is some Vi such that
δσj Pˆ ∈ V
σj
i for all j. It is in a pure site for the doubling morphism if if there is
some Vi such that for all j, δ
σj Pˆ is in the principal site of V
σj
i for σj-conjugate
of the doubling morphism.
Suppose Pˆ1, Pˆ2 ∈ Aˆ(k¯). Then (Pˆ1, Pˆ2) is in a pure site for mˆ if there is some
Vi ×Vj such that (δ
σr Pˆ1, δ
σr Pˆ2) is in the principal site of m
σr on V σri ×V
σr
j for
all r. If i = j = 0, then it is said to be in the principal site for mˆ.
Suppose Pˆ1, Pˆ2 ∈ Aˆ(k¯).
Suppose (Pˆ1, Pˆ2) belongs to a pure site for mˆ. Then there is mα : Uα → V ,
(δσi Pˆ1, δ
σi Pˆ2) ∈ Uα for all i, and Uα is the principal site for m on some Vj ×Vr.
In this case, mˆ(Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = mˆα(Pˆ1, Pˆ2).
More generally, if (δσi Pˆ1, δ
σi Pˆ2) ∈ Uαi , then mˆ(Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = Γ
−1v where v =
(vi)
d−1
i=0 and
vi = mαi(δ
σi Pˆ1, δ
σi Pˆ2) = 〈mˆαi(Pˆ1, Pˆ2),u
σi〉
Then
δσimˆ(Pˆ1, Pˆ2) =
∑d−1
j=0 wijvj =
∑d−1
j=0 wij〈mˆαj (Pˆ1, Pˆ2),u
σj〉
=
∑
α〈mˆα(Pˆ1, Pˆ2),
∑
j,αj=α
wiju
σj〉
=
∑
α〈mˆα(Pˆ1, Pˆ2), (Ωα)i〉
where Ωα =W
IαΓIα with Iα = {i : 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1, αi = α}.
If (Pˆ1, Pˆ2) belongs to a pure site for mˆ, then αi = α for all i, for some α,
Iα = {0, . . . , d−1},Ωα is the identity matrix, and we get mˆ(Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = mˆα(Pˆ1, Pˆ2)
as already discussed. If (Pˆ1, Pˆ2) belongs to a mixed site for mˆ, then the partition
of {0, . . . , d − 1} into Iα’s, together with Ωα and mα specifies the mixed site
containing (Pˆ1, Pˆ2).
We note the difference between this situation and the situation that arises
in § 2.8 is that in this case Iα also needs to be made public, consequently Ωα
reveals a linear relation among W (i)Γ(i), i = 0, . . . , d− 1. Therefore the number
of specified mixed sites should be carefully limited so that the publicized set of
(Iα, Ωα) yields a small number of relations. In our situation, it is enough to focus
on the principal sites for Aˆ, mˆ and the doubling morphism, hence there is no
need to publicize any mixed site. In this case we may focus on the principal site
V = V0 of A, consider m : V ×V → V and the doubling map V → V as rational
maps, and focus on their descent maps and functions over Vˆ .
3 A trapdoor discrete logarithm problem
We apply the blinding method of § 2.8 to define a trapdoor discrete-logarithm
problem.
As in § 2.8, let V ⊂ k¯n be an algebraic set defined by a finite set of polynomi-
als in K[x1, . . . , xn]. In the current context we assume that V describes an affine
piece of an abelian variety A defined over K. We assume that A[ℓ] ⊂ V (K).
Suppose m : V ×V → V is a rational map defined over K that describes the
addition morphism of A when restricted to V .
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The descent mˆ : Vˆ × Vˆ → Vˆ is formed in secret using u, and properly
specified to the public, so that the specification does not contain any global
descent and the entries in the matrixW = ρ−1 are blinded, following the methods
in Proposition 6, Proposition 7 and Proposition 9.
We consider (0, 1)-matrices M with the property that there are exactly two
nonzero entries (i, i1) and (i, i2) for row i, for i = 0, . . . , d− 1. Let EM = {(i− i1
mod d, i − i2 mod d : i = 0, . . . , d − 1}. For (a, b) ∈ EM , let IM,a,b = {i :
(i− i1, i− i2) = (a, b) mod d}.
Choose a set of N = O(d2) such matrices M1, . . . ,MN such that
1. |IMi,a,b| = Θ(d
ǫ) for all (a, b) ∈ EMi , for some positive constant ǫ < 1,
2. the identity matrix and M1, . . . ,MN span Matd(Fℓ).
Let for i = 1, . . . , N , ϕi = ϕMi be the map determined by Mi and let Ψi be
the map on Vˆ (K) blinding ϕi, as described in § 2.8. By Proposition 11 Ψi can
be specified to the public by specifying mˆ, and making public EMi , and Ωa,b for
every (a, b) ∈ EM . The property that |IMi,a,b| = Θ(d
ǫ) is to make sure that the
blinding of ϕi is strong so that Mi is hidden.
Find α, β ∈ A(K)[ℓ] such that eℓ(α, β) 6= 1. Then α and β are not in the
same cyclic group. Choose random xi, yi ∈ Fℓ such that and let Dβ ∈ Aˆ[ℓ] such
that Dβ corresponds to V = (xiα + yiβ)
d−1
i=0 ∈ A[ℓ]
d. We impose the condition
that for some i, j, xiα+ yiβ 6= xjα+ yjβ. This is to make sure that Dβ is not a
descent point, that is, there is no γ ∈ A[ℓ] such that ρ(Dβ) = (γ
σi)d−1i=0 .
Let M0 be the identity matrix and correspondingly ϕ0 = 1.
Let Λ be the non-commutative Fℓ-algebra generated byN variables z1, . . . , zN .
Let λ : Λ → EndAˆ(K)[ℓ] be the algebra morphism defined by λzi = Ψi for
i = 1, . . . , N .
Let ω : Λ → Matd(Fℓ) be the algebra morphism defined by ω(zi) = Mi for
i = 1, . . . , N .
3.1 Forming quadratic relations
To form a quadratic relation we choose random aij and compute the matrix
M =
∑
1≤i,j≤N aijMiMj. Then solve for bi such that M = b0 +
∑
1≤i≤N biMi.
Hence a polynomial R =
∑
1≤i,j≤N aijzizj −
∑N
i=0 bizi is determined such that
R(M1, . . . ,MN ) = 0. Let suppif denote the subset of suppf consisting of degree
i monomials. Then supp1R likely contains most of z1, . . . , zN .
Form a set of N1 = O(N) relations as above. For simplicity suppose N1 = N
and let R = {R1, . . . , RN} be the set of relations which are formed.
3.2 The discrete logarithm problem
Let J be the two-sided ideal of Λ generated by R.
For i > 0, let Ji be the submodule of J consisting of elements of degree less
than or equal to i.
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Let G = U1/U ∼= Z/ℓZ where U = JN and U1 = Fℓ + U . The discrete
logarithm problem on G is formally the problem of computing the map G →
Z/ℓZ sending a+ U ∈ G to a for a ∈ Fℓ.
We specify the discrete logarithm problem on G as follows.
1. The set R is made public, and J is specified as the two sided ideal of Λ
generated by R.
2. The group G is defined as U1/U , where U = JN , U1 = Fℓ + U . For a ∈ Fℓ,
a+U ∈ G is encoded by a sparse representative in a+U . More precisely, to
encode a, one follows the procedure described in § 3.3 to construct a sparse
element f ∈ U with |suppf | = O(N2). Let g =
∑
i aimi = f + a, where mi
are monomials of degree no greater than N . Then g is an encoding of a.
3. The discrete logarithm problem on G is: Given a sparse g ∈ U1, to determine
a ∈ Fℓ such that g ∈ a+ U .
The morphism ω is a trapdoor map since ωg = aI where I is the identity
matrix.
The discrete logarithm as specified above is the generic version that does not
involve the abelian variety A, and the maps Ψi on Aˆ[ℓ]. In this generic version
the first condition in forming Mi is not needed.
When the maps Ψi are specified together with Dβ ∈ Aˆ[ℓ], public identity
testing forG is made possible: for g ∈ U1, g ≡ 0 mod U if and only if λ(g)(Dβ) =
0. We call this version trapdoor discrete logarithm on G with public identity
testing.
3.3 Constructing random sparse elements in JN
We call an element f ∈ Λ s-sparse if |suppf | ≤ s. We describe a method to
construct an O(N2)-sparse f ∈ JN randomly with f =
∑N−1
i=1 fi so that
1. fi ∈ Ji+1 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1,
2. suppfi consists of monomials of degree i− 1, i, i+ 1 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1,
3. |suppfi ∩ suppfi+1| ≥ N
c for some constant 0 < c < 1, for i = 1, . . . , N − 2.
To construct f the first step is to form f1 as a random Fℓ linear combination
of R1, . . . , RN . Then proceed inductively to form fi for i = 2, . . . , N−1. Suppose
fi−1 has been determined. To form fi we do the following.
1. Form R
(i)
j =
∑
k rijkRk with random rijk ∈ Fℓ for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ N .
2. For j = 1, . . . , N , choose two random monomials m1j and m2j such that
degm1jm2j = i− 1, and set f
(i)
j = m1jR
(i)
j m2j .
3. Randomly choose N c terms in fi−1 of degree i. For each chosen term t, find
some R
(i)
j such that some variable zk ∈ supp1R
(i)
j appears in t. Write t =
am1zkm2 where a ∈ Fℓ and m1,m2 are monomials with degm1m2 = i − 1.
Set gt = m1R
(i)
j m2. Form G
(i) =
∑
t rtgt with random rt ∈ Fℓ and t ranges
over the N c chosen terms.
4. Set fi =
∑N
j=1 ajf
(i)
j +G
(i) with randomly chosen aj ∈ Fℓ for j = 1, . . . , N .
Note that |suppf | = O(N2).
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4 Trilinear maps involving Weil descent
4.1 Constructing the trilinear map
To construct a trilinear map, we take an abelian variety A of dimension g defined
over a finite field K of extension degree d over a finite field k, and consider the
descent Aˆ of A with respect to a random secret basis u of K over k. The descent
Aˆ and mˆ are specified to the public in such a way that the specification does not
contain any global descent. For simplicity assume log ℓ, d and log |k| are linear
in the security parameter n, whereas g = O(1).
The trilinear map will take the form G1 ×G2 ×G3 → µℓ ⊂ K where G1 is a
cyclic group generated by a point Dα ∈ Aˆ(K)[ℓ], G2 is a cyclic group generated
by a point Dβ ∈ Aˆ(K)[ℓ], and G3 is a cyclic group with a trapdoor as discussed
in § 3.
As in § 3, we choose a set of N = O(d2) many (0, 1)-matrices M1, . . . ,MN
that span Matd(Fℓ), so that each M =Mi has the following properties:
1. There are exactly two nonzero entries (i, i1) and (i, i2) for row i, for i =
0, . . . , d− 1.
2. Let EM = {(i− i1 mod d, i− i2 mod d : i = 0, . . . , d− 1}. For (a, b) ∈ EM ,
let IM,a,b = {i : (i − i1, i − i2) = (a, b) mod d}. Then |IMi,a,b| = Θ(d
ǫ) for
all (a, b) ∈ EMi , for some positive constant ǫ < 1,
Let Λ be the non-commutative Fℓ-algebra generated byN variables z1, . . . , zN .
Let λ : Λ → EndAˆ(K)[ℓ] be the algebra morphism defined by λzi = Ψi for
i = 1, . . . , N .
We have the following commutative diagram:
Aˆ[ℓ]
ρ
→
∏
iA
σi [ℓ]
∏
i
σ−i
→ A[ℓ]d
↓ Ψi ↓ ϕMi
Aˆ[ℓ]
ρ
→
∏
iA
σi [ℓ]
∏
i σ−i→ A[ℓ]d
Let eℓ : A[ℓ] × A[ℓ] → µℓ be a nondegenerate bilinear pairing. On Aˆ[ℓ] we
define for Dˆ1, Dˆ2 ∈ Aˆ[ℓ],
eˆ(Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
d−1∏
i=0
ei(δ
σiDˆ1, δ
σiDˆ2)
where ei = e
σi
ℓ . Note that eˆ is the blinded version of the pairing
∏d−1
i=0 ei on∏d−1
i=0 A
σi [ℓ].
Find α, β ∈ A(K)[ℓ] such that eℓ(α, β) 6= 1. Then α and β are not in the
same cyclic group. Choose random xi, yi ∈ Fℓ such that and let Dα ∈ Aˆ[ℓ] such
that Dα corresponds to V = (xiα + yiβ)
d−1
i=0 ∈ A[ℓ]
d. We impose the condition
that for some i, j, xiα+ yiβ 6= xjα+ yjβ. This is to make sure that Dα is not a
descent point, that is, there is no γ ∈ A[ℓ] such that ρ(Dα) = (γ
σi)d−1i=0 .
25
Similarly, choose random x′i, y
′
i ∈ Fℓ such that and let Dβ ∈ Aˆ[ℓ] such that
Dβ corresponds to V = (x
′
iα + y
′
iβ)
d−1
i=0 ∈ A[ℓ]
d. We impose the condition that
for some i, j, x′iα+ y
′
iβ 6= x
′
jα+ y
′
jβ, so that Dβ is not a descent point.
Furthermore, xi, yi, x
′
i, y
′
i are chosen so that
eˆ(Dα, Dβ) =
∏
i
(eℓ((xiα+ yiβ), (x
′
iα+ y
′
iβ)))
σi 6= 1.
Form, as in § 3, a setR ofN1 = O(N) dense quadratic relations onM1, . . . ,MN .
For simplicity suppose N1 = N and let R = {R1, . . . , RN} be the set of relations
which are formed. Let J be the two-sided ideal of Λ generated by R.
Let G1 be the group generated by Dα. Let G2 be the group generated by
Dβ . Let G3 = U1/U ∼= Z/ℓZ where U = JN and U1 = Fℓ + U .
The trilinear map G1×G2×G3 → µℓ sends (xDα, yDβ, z+U) to ζ
xyz where
ζ = eˆ(Dα, Dβ). Suppose z + U is represented by some sparse γ ∈ z + U . Then
eˆ(xDα, λ(γ)(yDβ)) = eˆ(xDα, zyDβ) = ζ
xyz.
The sparsity constraint is to make sure that the map γ can be efficiently
executed,so that the trilinear map can be efficiently computed, assuming the
pairing is efficiently computable.
We note that if the two secret descent bases were identical then the published
pairing eˆ together with some Ψi can be used to induce self pairing on G1. Namely
if eˆ(Dα, Ψi(Dα)) 6= 1, then we have an efficiently computable pairing G1×G1 →
µℓ, hence G1 would not satisfy DDH assumption. Similar observation applies to
G2. As for G3, neither the pairing eˆ nor the trilinear map naturally induce a self
pairing on the group.
In order for the cyclic groups G1 and G3 to satisfy the DDH assumption, we
can construct the two groups on two descent Aˆ and Aˆ′ of A with respect two
secret bases. Then the pairing eˆ : Aˆ[ℓ] × Aˆ′[ℓ] → µℓ cannot be used to define a
self pairing on G1 or G2 directly.
In this setting, we fix a public basis θ1, . . . , θd ofK/k, a private basis u1, . . . , ud
of K/k, and another private basis u′1, . . . , u
′
d of K/k.
Let δ denote the basic descent map k¯d → k¯ with respect to u1, . . . , ud, and ρ
the bijective linear map k¯d → k¯d determined by δ.
Let δ′ denote the basic descent map k¯d → k¯ with respect to u′1, . . . , u
′
d, and
ρ′ the bijective linear map k¯d → k¯d determined by δ′.
Let Aˆ denote the descent of A with respect to the basis u1, . . . , ud.
Let Aˆ′ denote the descent of A with respect to the basis u′1, . . . , u
′
d.
Then eˆ : Aˆ′[ℓ]× Aˆ[ℓ] is defined such that for D1 ∈ Aˆ
′[ℓ] , D2 ∈ Aˆ[ℓ],
eˆ(D1, D2) =
∏
0≤i≤d−1
ei(δ
′σi(D1), δ
σi(D2)).
We publish the following
1. D′α and Dβ where D
′
α is the image of Dα under the natural isomorphism
between Aˆ and Aˆ′ determined by ρ′−1ρ,
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2. the program for computing the descent mˆ of the addition m on Aˆ, the pro-
gram for computing the descent mˆ′ of the addition m on Aˆ′,
3. the programs for computing Ψi, i = 1, . . . , N ,
4. the set R of relations
We also need to specify eˆ such that it is efficiently computable in the public
while u and u′ remain secret. We will show how this can be done when A is the
Jacobian variety of a hyperelliptic curve in the next section.
5 Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves
We consider the Jacobian variety J = JC of a hyperelliptic curve C of genus g
with an affine model y2 = f(x) where f ∈ K[x] of degree 2g + 1 where g > 1.
Again let d = [K : k], and for simplicity assume log ℓ, d and log |k| are linear
in the security parameter n, whereas g = O(1). All computations described
below will take time polynomially bounded in log ℓ, d, log |k|, and gO(g), hence
polynomially bounded in n.
We follow [4] and consider the birational model for representing points of
J by reduced divisors on C. Following [4], a semireduced divisor is of the form∑r
i=1 Pi−r∞, where if Pi = (xi, yi) then Pj 6= (xi,−yi) for j 6= i. A semireduced
divisor D can be uniquely represented by a pair of polynomials (a, b) such that
a(x) =
∏r
i=1(x − xi), deg(b) < deg(a) , and b
2 ≡ f mod a. We write D =
div(a, b). The divisor D is K-rational if a, b ∈ K[x]. A reduced divisor is a
semireduced divisor D with r ≤ g, represented by a pair of polynomials (a, b)
where deg b < deg a ≤ g and a is monic.
To describe the sites of the Jacobian variety, let us consider briefly polynomial
division. Let f and g be polynomials of degrees n and m respectively. Then
f = qg + r where deg q = n − m and deg r ≤ m − 1. Let (fi)
n
i=0, (gi)
m
i=0,
(qi)
n−m
i=0 and (ri)
m−1
i=0 be the coefficient vectors of f, g, q, r respectively. Then
qn−m−i can be expressed as a rational function in fi’s and gi’s of degree i + 1,
for i = 0, . . . , n − m; and ri can be expressed as a rational function of degree
n−m+ 2 for i = 0, . . . ,m− 1. When g is monic then qn−m−i can be expressed
as a polynomial in fi’s and gi’s of degree i+ 1, for i = 0, . . . , n−m; and ri can
be expressed as a polynomial of degree n−m+ 2 for i = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
A point on J is represented by a reduced divisor div(a, b) where a is monic,
deg a ≤ g and deg b ≤ deg a − 1, satisfying f ≡ b2 mod a. The last condition
can be expressed by demanding the remainder of the division of f − b2 by a to
be 0. From the discussion above this translates into deg a polynomial conditions
of degree O(g), namely by setting the deg a many remainder polynomials to
zero. We have g + 1 disjoint affine pieces Vi, i = 0, . . . , g, where Vi corresponds
to the case where deg a = g − i. Each piece is an algebraic subset of k¯2g+1.
A K-rational point of J corresponds to a K-rational pair (a, b), which can be
naturally identified with a K-rational point in K2g+1. The principal site of J is
V0, corresponding to the case deg a = g.
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The addition law can be described in terms of two algorithms: composition of
semireduced divisors and reduction of a semireduced divisor to a reduced divisor
[4].
Suppose D1 = div(a1, b1) and D2 = div(a2, b2) are two semireduced divisors.
Then D1 + D2 = D + (h) where D = div(a, b) is semireduced and h(x) is a
function, and a, b and h can be computed by a composition algorithm. We have
h = gcd(a1, a2, b1 + b2) = h1a1 + h2a2 + h3(b1 + b2)
where h1, h2 and h3 are polynomials and h is monic.
a =
a1a2
h2
b =
h1a1b2 + h2a2b1 + h3(b1b2 + f)
h
mod a
Suppose D = div(a, b) is a semireduced divisor with deg a > g. Then a
reduction when applied to D results in a smaller semi-reduced divisor E =
div(a′, b′) where
a′ =
f − b2
a
b′ = −b mod a′,
and D = E + (h′) with h′ = y−b
a′
. We have deg a′ ≤ deg a− 2.
If D1 and D2 are two reduced divisors then after a composition we get a
semireduced divisor of degree at most 2g. So in O(g) iterations of reductions we
eventually obtained a reduced divisor D3 and a function h so that D1 +D2 =
D3 + (h). We call this computation addition: on input reduced divisors D1 =
div(a1, b1) and D2 = div(a2, b2), a reduced divisor D3 = div(a3, b3) together
with a function h are constructed, so that D1 +D2 = D3 + (h).
Note that the function h is of the form h1h2 where h1(x) is a polynomial
monic of degree less than 2g resulting from the composition step, and h2 is the
product of O(g) functions of the form y−β(x)
a′(x) , each resulting from a reduction
step, where the degrees of β(x) and a′(x) are less than 2g.
We define the degree of a rational function f/g, where f and g are polyno-
mials, to be the maximum of deg f and deg g.
We observe that the basic operations in composition and reduction are poly-
nomial addition, multiplication and division (to obtain quotient and remainder).
The addition of two reduced divisors involves O(g) polynomial divisions. Each
division leads to O(g) branches of computation depending on the degree of the
remainder. The degrees of the coefficients of quotient and remainder polynomials
as polynomials in the coefficients of a1, b1, a2 and b2 increase by a factor of O(g)
with each division. From a routine analysis we see that the map m on Vi×Vj can
be divided into gO(g) sites. Each case is a rational map defined by O(g) functions
of degree gO(g) in the coefficients of a1, b1, a2, b2, and the semi-algebraic set for
the site is defined by gO(1) polynomials of degree gO(g) in a1, b1, a2 and b2.
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For an unknown reduced divisor D = div(a, b) we let xD denote the list of
variables representing the coefficients of a and b. From the addition algorithm
and the analysis above, we see that the coefficients of h1(x) and each a
′(x) and
β(x) are rational functions of degree gO(g) in xD1 and xD2 .
At the principal site of m on Vi × Vj , h1 = 1, hence h is the product of
O(g) functions of the form y−β(x)
a′(x) , each resulting from a reduction step, where
the degrees of β(x) and a′(x) are less than 2g, and their coefficients are rational
functions of degree gO(g) in xD1 and xD2 .
Similarly at the principal site of the doubling map 2 on Vi, if we write 2D =
D′+(h) where D is a reduced divisor at the site and D′ is the resulting reduced
divisor. Then h is the product of O(g) functions of the form y−β(x)
a′(x) , where
the degrees of β(x) and a′(x) are less than 2g, with coefficients being rational
functions of degree gO(g) in xD.
Summarizing our discussion so far, we have the following.
Proposition 12. 1. The addition of reduced divisors at a site Vi × Vj, and
similarly the doubling map at a site Vi, can be divided into g
O(g) cases.
Each case is a rational map defined by O(g) functions of degree gO(g) on an
algebraic set, and the algebraic set is defined by gO(1) polynomials of degree
gO(g).
2. If we write D1+D2 = D3+(h) where Di are reduced divisors for i = 1, 2, 3,
(D1, D2) belongs to a site of m on Vi×Vj, and h is a function, then h = h1h2,
where h1(x) is a polynomial monic of degree less than 2g resulting from the
composition step, and h2 is the product of O(g) functions of the form
y−β(x)
a′(x) ,
each resulting from a reduction step. The degrees of β(x) and a′(x) are less
than 2g, and the coefficients of h1(x) and each a
′(x) and β(x) are rational
functions of degree gO(g) in xD1 and xD2 . Moreover, at the principal site of
m on Vi × Vj , h1 = 1.
3. Similarly at the principal site of the doubling map 2 on Vi, if we write 2D =
D′ + (h) where D is a reduced divisor at the site and D′ is the resulting
reduced divisor. Then h is the product of O(g) functions of the form y−β(x)
a′(x) ,
where the degrees of β(x) and a′(x) are less than 2g, with coefficients being
rational functions of degree gO(g) in xD.
In pairing computation we will need to evaluate the function h on reduced
divisors. To this end it is sufficient to consider functions that are either polyno-
mials in x, or of the form y − β(x) where β(x) is a polynomial in x.
Let ν∞ denote the valuation on the function field of C at infinity. Then
ν∞(x) = −2 and ν∞(y) = −(2g+1), and x
gy−1 is a local uniformizing parameter
for ν∞.
For functions f and g we write f ∼∞ g if
f
g
(∞) = 1.
For f ∈ K[x] let f∞ denote the leading coefficient of f . Then ν∞(f) =
−2 deg f and f ∼∞ f∞x
deg f .
We assume that the hyperelliptic curve is given by an equation y2 − f(x)
where deg f = 2g+1 and f is monic. In this case if ν∞(x
ayb) = 0 then xayb(∞) =
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1. This is because ν∞(x) is even and ν∞(y) is odd, so b must be even. Put b = 2c.
Then ν∞(x
ayb) = 0 implies a+ c(2g + 1) = 0. We have
xayb = xay2 = xaf c ∼∞ x
a+c(2g+1) = 1.
Consider the function y − b where b ∈ K[x]. If deg b ≤ g then ν∞(y − b) =
ν∞(y) = −(2g + 1), and ν∞(y
−1b) > 0. We have y−b
y
(∞) = (1 − y−1b)(∞) = 1,
so y ∼∞ y − b.
If deg b > g then ν∞(b
−1y) > 0. We have y−b
b
(∞) = (b−1y− 1)(∞) = −1, so
y − b ∼∞ −b.
Suppose a function h is of the form h = h1(x)
h2(x)
∏
i y−βi(x), where h1, h2 and
βi are polynomials in x. Then we have
h ∼∞
(h1)∞
(h2)∞
∏
i,deg βi>g
(−βi)∞x
ayb
where a = deg h1 − deg h2 +
∑
i,deg βi>g
deg βi and b is the number of i with
deg βi ≤ g.
We have the following.
Lemma 9. 1. We assume that the hyperelliptic curve is given by an equation
y2− f(x) where deg f = 2g+1 and f is monic. In this case if ν∞(x
ayb) = 0
then xayb(∞) = 1.
2. Suppose a function h is of the form h = h1(x)
h2(x)
∏
i y − βi(x), where h1, h2
and βi are polynomials in x. Let h∞ =
(h1)∞
(h2)∞
∏
i,deg βi>g
(−βi)∞ Then h ∼∞
h∞x
ayb, where a = deg h1 − deg h2 +
∑
i,deg βi>g
deg βi and b is the number
of i with deg βi ≤ g.
Consider now the evaluation of h, which is either a polynomial in x or of the
form y − β(x) where β(x) is a polynomial in x, at the affine part of a reduced
divisor.
Let
D = div(a′, b′) =
∑
i
Pi − r∞
be a reduced divisor. Then y(Pi) = b
′(Pi), so
(y − β)(
∑
i
Pi) = (b
′ − β)(
∑
i
Pi) =
∏
i
(b′ − β)(αi)
where a′(x) =
∏
i(x− αi).
Let Φ(x) =
∑2g−1
i=0 tix
i ∈ K[x, t0, . . . , t2g−1]. We can construct by the fun-
damental theorem of symmetric polynomials a polynomial S(t, z) where t =
t0, . . . , t2g−1 and z = z1, . . . , zg, such that
S(t, s1(z), . . . , sg(z)) =
g∏
i=1
Φ(zi)
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where si(z) is the i-th symmetric expression in z1, . . . , zg (s1(z) = z1 + . . .+ zg
for example). The polynomial S has degree O(g) in t and degree O(g) in z.
Let f =
∑m
i=0 aix
i ∈ K[x] of degreem < 2g. Denote by c(f) = (a0, . . . , am, 0, . . . , 0)
the (2g)-vector consisting of the coefficients of f padded with 0’s if necessary.
Let ρ(x) ∈ K[x] of degree r ≤ g and monic. Let γ1, . . . , γr be the roots of ρ
and let γ = γ1, . . . , γr. Then
ρ(x) =
r∏
i=1
(x− γi) = x
r +
r∑
i=1
(−1)isi(γ)x
r−i.
Let s(ρ) = (s1(γ), . . . , sr(γ), 0, . . . , 0), the g-vector consisting of si(γ) and
padded with 0 if necessary.
We have
S(c(f), s(ρ)) =
r∏
i=1
f(γi).
Therefore if D = div(a, b) is a reduced divisor then D = D+ − r∞ for some
r ≤ g, then
f(D+) = S(c(f), s(a)).
For function y − β(x) where deg β < 2g, then y − β(D+) = b − β(D+).
Therefore
(y − β)(D+) = S(c(b− β), s(a)).
We have proved the following.
Lemma 10. 1. Let f =
∑m
i=0 aix
i ∈ K[x] of degree m < 2g. Denote by c(f) =
(a0, . . . , am, 0, . . . , 0) the (2g)-vector consisting of the coefficients of f padded
with 0’s if necessary. If D = div(a, b) is a reduced divisor, write D = D+ −
r∞ for some r ≤ g, then f(D+) = S(c(f), s(a)).
2. For function y − β(x), then y − β(D+) = b− β(D+). Therefore
(y − β)(D+) = S(c(b− β), s(a)).
Let D1 = div(a1, b1) be a reduced divisor. Then 2D1 = D
′ + (h) where D′
is a reduced divisor and h is a function. By Proposition 12 we know that h is of
the form h1h2 where h1 ∈ K[x] is of degree less than 2g and h2 =
∏
i
y−βi(x)
a′
i
(x)
where βi(x) and a
′
i(x) are polynomials in x, and deg βi and the number of i are
both less than 2g. Put h3(x) =
∏
i a
′
i(x). Then deg h3(x) = O(g
2).
Let h+(xD) denote the function h as it applies to evaluate the positive part
D+ of a reduced divisor D = div(a, b). Then by Lemma 10,
h+(xD) = h(D
+) =
S(c(h1), s(a))
S(c(h3), s(a))
∏
i
S(c(b− βi), s(a)).
At each site of the doubling map, we have, by Proposition 12,
h1(x) =
∑2g−1
i=0 λi(xD1 )x
i
h3(x) =
∑d
i=0 λ
′
i(xD1 )x
i
βi(x) =
∑2g−1
j=0 µij(xD1)x
j
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where d = O(g2), λi, λ
′
i and µij are rational functions of degree g
O(g) in xD1 .
Since h1 is monic, (h1)∞ = 1, and we have
h∞ =
(h1)∞
(h3)∞
∏
i,deg βi>g
(−βi)∞ =
∏
i,deg βi>g
(−βi)∞
(h3)∞
.
Let λ(xD1 ) denote the sequence of λi(xD1) and similarly λ
′(xD1) denote the
sequence of λ′i(xD1 ), and µ(xD) denote the sequence of µij(xD1 ). Then h∞ can
be determined from λ′ and µ.
Then we can write S(c(h1), s(a))
∏
i S(c(b−βi), s(a)) = A(λ(xD1 ), µ(xD1 ), xD)
and S(c(h3), s(a)) = B(λ
′(xD1), xD), and since S has degree O(g) in each of the
variable, it follows that A is polynomial in xD of degree O(g
3) and rational in
xD1 of degree g
O(g), and B is polynomial in xD of degree O(g
3) and rational
in xD1 of degree g
O(g). Therefore each coefficient of h+ can be expressed as a
rational function of degree gO(g) in xD1 .
We have proved the following:
Proposition 13. Let D1 = div(a1, b1) be a reduced divisor. Then 2D1 = D
′ +
(h) where D′ is a reduced divisor and h is a function of the form h1h2 where
h1 ∈ K[x] is of degree less than 2g and h2 =
∏
i
y−βi(x)
a′
i
(x) where βi(x) and a
′
i(x)
are polynomials in x, and deg βi and the number of i are both less than 2g. Put
h3(x) =
∏
i a
′
i(x). Then d = deg h3(x) = O(g
2).
1. Let h+(xD) denote the function h as it applies to evaluate the positive part
D+ of a reduced divisor D = div(a, b). Then
h+(xD) = h(D
+) =
S(c(h1), s(a))
S(c(h3), s(a))
∏
i
S(c(b− βi), s(a)).
At each site of the doubling map, we have
h1(x) =
∑2g−1
i=0 λi(xD1)x
i
h3(x) =
∑d
i=0 λ
′
i(xD1)x
i
βi(x) =
∑2g−1
j=0 µij(xD1 )x
j
where λi, λ
′
i and µij are rational functions of degree g
O(g) in xD1 .
Let λ(xD1 ) denote the sequence of λi(xD1 ) and similarly λ
′(xD1 ) denote the
sequence of λ′i(xD1 ), and µ(xD) denote the sequence of µij(xD1 ). Then we
can write S(c(h1), s(a))
∏
i S(c(b − βi), s(a)) = A(λ(xD1 ), µ(xD1 ), xD) and
S(c(h3), s(a)) = B(λ
′(xD1), xD), where A is polynomial in xD of degree
O(g3) and rational in xD1 of degree g
O(g), and B is polynomial in xD of
degree O(g3) and rational in xD1 of degree g
O(g).
2. h∞ =
∏
i,deg βi>g
(−βi)∞
(h3)∞
and h∞ can be determined from λ
′(xD1) and µ(xD1).
We denote by hD1 the function h in Proposition 13, which is constructed by
the addition algorithm.
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6 Pairing computation
We keep the same notation as the last section and consider the pairing on J [ℓ]
defined by Weil reciprocity.
If a reduced divisor D represents an ℓ-torsion point, then ℓD is the divisor of
a function f . Given two reduced divisors D1 and D2 that represent two ℓ-torsion
points, we define the pairing to be
e(D1, D2) =
f1(D2)
f2(D1)
where ℓDi = (fi) for i = 1, 2.
Let D be a reduced divisor representing a point on J . Then 2D = (hD) +
D1 for some reduced divisor D1. For pairing computation we consider hD as a
function that can evaluate at divisors of degree zero. Thus on input a reduced
divisor D′ = div(a′, b′), hD(D
′) ∈ k¯. We note that any ahD with a ∈ K
∗ defines
the same function on divisors of degree zero.
Suppose D is a ℓ-torsion divisor. We recall how to efficiently construct h such
that ℓD = (h) through the squaring trick [12,13].
Apply addition to double D, and get
2D = (hD) +D1
where D1 is reduced. Inductively, we have Hi such that
2iD = (Hi) +Di
with Di reduced. Apply addition to double Di and get
2Di = (hDi) +Di+1
with Di+1 reduced. Then
2i+1D = (Hi+1) +Di+1
where Hi+1 = H
2
i hDi .
Write ℓ =
∑
i ai2
i with ai ∈ {0, 1}. There are O(log ℓ) non-zero ai. So apply
O(log ℓ) many more additions and we can construct h such that ℓD = (h).
Therefore if D1 and D2 are two reduced divisors, we can construct in this way
f1 and f2 such that (fi) = ℓDi for i = 1, 2. Moreover if we write Di = D
+
i − ri∞
for i = 1, 2, then ν∞fi = −ℓri for i = 1, 2. So ν∞(f
−r2
1 f
r1
2 ) = 0. Now it follows
from Lemma 9 that
f1(−r2∞)
f2(−r1∞)
= α−r2βr1
where α = (f1)∞ and β = (f2)∞.
For Dˆ1 ∈ Jˆ [ℓ], Dˆ2 ∈ Jˆ
′[ℓ]
eˆ(Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
d−1∏
i=0
ei(δ
σiDˆ1, δ
′σiDˆ2)
where ei denotes the pairing defined by Weil reciprocity on J
σi .
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Lemma 11. Let Dˆ ∈ Jˆ(K). Suppose 2Dˆ = Dˆ′ as points on Jˆ(K). Then
2δDˆσ−i = (hδDˆσ−i ) + δDˆ
′
σ−i
,
and
2δσiDˆ = (hσi
δDˆσ−i
) + δσiDˆ′.
ProofWe have δσiDˆ = (δDˆσ−i)σi with δDˆσ−i ∈ J(K). Moreover since 2Dˆ = Dˆ′
in Jˆ(K), we have 2δσiDˆ = δσiDˆ′, and it follows that 2δDˆσ−i = δDˆ′
σ−i
, as points
on J . Therefore as reduced divisors on C, we have
2δDˆσ−i = (hδDˆσ−i ) + δDˆ
′
σ−i
.
It follows that
2δσiDˆ = (hσi
δDˆσ−i
) + δσiDˆ′.
✷
Suppose 2D = (hD)+D1 as before. By Proposition 13, h = hD is of the form
h = h1(x)
h3(x)
∏
i y − βi(x), h∞ =
∏
i,deg βi>g
−(βi)∞
(h3)∞
, and
h1(x) =
∑2g−1
i=0 λi(xD)x
i
h3(x) =
∑d
i=0 λ
′
i(xD)x
i
βi(x) =
∑2g−1
j=0 µij(xD)x
j
where λi, λ
′
i and µij are rational functions of degree g
O(g) in xD.
Since (h3)∞ and (βi)∞ are determined respectively from their leading coef-
ficients of the polynomials h3 and βi, hence they are determined by λ
′
i(xD) and
µij(xD).
Let
h′1(x) =
∑2g−1
i=0 λi(δDˆ
σ−i)xi
h′3(x) =
∑d
i=0 λ
′
i(δDˆ
σ−i)xi
β′i(x) =
∑2g−1
j=0 µij(δDˆ
σ−i )xj
Then
hδDˆσ−i =
h′1(x)
h′3(x)
∏
i
(y − β′i(x)).
So
hσi
δDˆσ−i
=
h′
σi
1 (x)
h′σi3 (x)
∏
j
(y − β′
σi
j (x)).
For f = λi, λ
′
i or µij , we have
(f(δDˆσ−i )σi = fσi(δσiDˆ).
So
h′
σi
1 (x) =
∑2g−1
j=0 λ
σi
j (δ
σiDˆ)xj
h′σi3 (x) =
∑d
j=0 λ
′σi
j (δ
σiDˆ)xj
β′j(x) =
∑2g−1
k=0 µ
σi
jk(δ
σiDˆ)xk
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It follows that (hσi
δDˆσ−i
)∞ can be determined from (λ
′
j)
σi (δσiDˆ) and (µjk)
σi(δσiDˆ),
which, as functions in Dˆ.
We have proved the following.
Lemma 12. The function (hσi
δDˆσ−i
)∞ is determined by (λ
′
j)
σi (δσiDˆ) and (µjk)
σi(δσiDˆ).
LetD = div(a, b) andD′ = div(a′, b′) be reduced divisors. By Proposition 13,
we have
h+D(xD′ ) =
A(λ(xD), µ(xD), xD′)
B(λ′(xD), xD′ )
whereA(λ(xD), µ(xD), xD′) = S(c(h1), s(a
′))
∏
i S(c(b
′−βi), s(a
′)) and B(λ′(xD), xD′) =
S(c(h3), s(a
′)), A is polynomial in xD of degree O(g
3) and rational in xD1 of de-
gree gO(g), and B is polynomial in xD of degree O(g
3) and rational in xD1 of
degree gO(g).
Let Dˆ1 ∈ Aˆ(K) and Dˆ2 ∈ Aˆ
′(K). Then
h
δDˆ
σ
−i
1
((δ′Dˆ
σ−i
2 )
+) =
A(λ(δDˆ
σ−i
1 ), µ(δDˆ
σ−i
1 ), δ
′Dˆ
σ−i
2 )
B(λ′(δDˆ
σ−i
1 ), δ
′Dˆ
σ−i
2 )
It follows that
hσi
δDˆ
σ
−i
1
((δ′
σiDˆ2)
+) =
Aσi(λσi (δσiDˆ1), µ
σi
1 (δ
σiDˆ1), δ
′σiDˆ2)
Bσi(λ′σi(δσiDˆ1), δ′σiDˆ2)
Write A/B in the form
A(λ(xD), µ(xD), xD′)
B(λ′(xD), xD′)
=
A1(xD, xD′)
B1(xD, x′D)
where A1 and B1 are polynomials in xD and xD′ .
Let ϕ : J × J → k¯ be the rational function defined by A1/B1. Then
We have
hσi
δDˆ
σ
−i
1
((δ′
σiDˆ2)
+) =
Aσi1 (δ
σiDˆ1, δ
′σiDˆ2)
Bσi1 (δ
σiDˆ1, δ′σiDˆ2)
= ϕσi(δσiDˆ1, δ
′σiDˆ2)
We have proved the following:
Lemma 13. Let A and B be polynomials as defined in Proposition 13. Write
A/B in the form
A(λ(xD), µ(xD), xD′)
B(λ′(xD), xD′)
=
A1(xD, xD′)
B1(xD, x′D)
where A1 and B1 are polynomials of degree O(g
3) in xD and degree g
O(g) in
xD′ . Let ϕ : J × J → k¯ be the rational function defined by A1/B1. Then
ϕσi(δσiDˆ1, δ
′σiDˆ2) = h
σi
δDˆ
σ
−i
1
((δ′
σiDˆ2)
+).
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Put Dˆ0 = Dˆ. Suppose inductively 2Dˆj = Dˆj+1. Inductively, we have H
(i)
j
such that
2jδσiDˆ = (H
(i)
j ) + δ
σiDˆj
with Dˆj reduced. Apply addition to double δ
σiDˆj and get
2δσiDˆj = (h
σi
δDˆ
σ
−i
j
) + δσiDˆj+1
with δDˆj+1 reduced. Then
2j+1δσiDˆ = (H
(i)
j+1) + δ
σiDˆj+1
where H
(i)
j+1 = (H
(i)
j )
2hσi
δDˆ
σ
−i
j
.
Write ℓ =
∑
i ai2
i with ai ∈ {0, 1}. There are O(log ℓ) non-zero ai. So apply
O(log ℓ) many more additions and we can construct H
(i)
Dˆ
such that ℓδσiDˆ =
(H
(i)
Dˆ
).
For Dˆ1, Dˆ2 ∈ Aˆ[ℓ],
ei(δ
σiDˆ1, δ
′σiDˆ2) =
∏
i

H(i)Dˆ1(δ′σiDˆ2)
H
(i)
Dˆ2
(δσiDˆ1)


ai
.
In summary, to specify the program for eˆ, it is enough to specify O(g2d)
many descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set C of O(g2) rational
functions on J . The set C contains the following functions
1. O(g) functions that define m : J × J → J ,
2. ϕ : J × J → k¯ such that ϕ(xD, xD′) = hD(D
′+),
3. O(g2) functions ( λ′i, µij) from which (hD)∞ can be determined.
The following descent functions are specified: ϕ◦(δ, δ′), (λ′j)◦δ and µjk ◦δ where
hσi
δDˆσ−i
((δ′
σiDˆ′)+) = ϕσi(δσiDˆ, δ′
σiDˆ′), ϕ(xD , xD′) =
A1(xD,xD′ )
B1(xD ,xD′)
and A1 and B1
are polynomials of degree O(g3) in xD and degree g
O(g) in xD′ .
The associated descent functions with blinded constant factors can all be
specified properly.
For g > 1, the degrees of the functions f ∈ C are all greater than 1. Perform
a birational transformation ι as described in § 2.5 if necessary, we can replace
these functions f ∈ C by functions f ◦ ι−1 which are likely dense for some degree
at least 2, hence are immune to the linear attack described in § 2.4. Moreover
f ◦ ι−1 is secret since ι is secretly chosen.
We have proved the following:
Theorem 1. Efficient computation for the blinded pairing eˆℓ on Jˆ [ℓ] can be
properly specified, such that the specification does not contain any global descent.
More precisely, to specify the program for eˆ, it is enough to specify O(g2d) many
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descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set C of O(g2) rational func-
tions on J . For g > 1, the degrees of the functions f ∈ C are all greater than
1. Suppose by performing a birational transformation ι as described in § 2.5 if
necessary, and the functions f ◦ ι−1, which replaces f ∈ C, are dense for some
degree at least 2. Then the specification is safe from the linear attack described
in § 2.4. Moreover f ◦ ι−1 for f ∈ C is secret since ι is secretly chosen.
7 The elliptic curve case
In this section we specialize the trilinear map construction to the case where the
dimension of the abelian variety A is one, namely the elliptic curve case. We
take the abelian variety to be an elliptic curve E defined over K. Suppose the
characteristic of K is not 2 or 3, and E is given y2 = x3 + ax+ b with a, b ∈ K.
A reduced divisor (x− a, b) in this case corresponds to an a point (a, b) ∈ E(k¯),
and the reduced divisor (1, 0) corresponds to the zero point of E (the point at
infinity), which is not on the affine model y2 = x3 + ax + b. In this case the
correspondence between a reduced divisor and a point is very direct. We can
regard E(k¯) as consisting of an affine piece V = {(1, x, y) : y2 = x3 + ax + b},
and a zero point (0, 1, 0). When we deal with nonzero points we can simply
identify V with the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b, which is the principal site of E.
The addition map can be described as follows (see [17]). Let P1 = (x1, y1),
P2 = (x2, y2) be two points on V . If x1 = x2 and y1 = −y2, then P1 + P2 = 0.
Otherwise, we can find P3 = (x3,−y3) such that P1, P2 and P¯3 = (x3, y3) lie on
a line y = λx + ν, and we have P1 + P2 = P3.
(1) If x1 6= x2, then λ =
y2−y1
x2−x1
and ν = y1x2−y2x1
x2−x1
.
(2) If x1 = x2 and y1 6= 0, then λ =
3x21+a
2y1
and ν =
−x31+ax1+2b
2y1
In both cases x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, y3 = −λx3 − ν.
The principal site of the addition map corresponds to Case (1) and consists of
(P1, P2) ∈ V × V where P1 = (x1, y1), P2 = (x2, y2) and x1 6= x2, corresponding
to Case (1).
The principal site of the doubling map corresponds to Case (2) and consists
of P = (x1, y1) ∈ V where y1 6= 0.
Note that for doubling map all but the two torsion points are at the principal
site. For D = P1 − ∞ where P1 = (x1, y1) is not 2-torsion, we have 2D =
(hD) +D
′ where D′ = P3 −∞ with P3 = (x3, y3) given by the formula above,
and hD(x.y) =
L
x−x1
where L = y − λx− ν, λ =
3x21+a
2y1
and ν =
−x31+ax1+2b
2y1
.
Observe that in this situation (hD)∞ = 1, therefore for pairing computation
we only need to focus on hD as a function on the affine points, namely (x, y) ∈ V .
The degree of the addition map is of degree at least 2 in x1, y1 and in x2, y2.
The degree of the doubling map is of degree at least 2 in x and y as well. However
the degree of hD in x (resp. y) is 1. This raises the concern of the possibility of
linear attack discussed in § 2.4. To prevent such an attack we consider birational
models of y2 = x3 + ax+ b where the corresponding function for hD is of degree
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greater than 1 in all variables. We consider one such model
E1 :
(
αx21
βx1 + γx2
)2
= x31 + ax1 + b
with the birational map ι1 : E1 → E sending (x1, x2) ∈ E1 to (x, y) ∈ E
where x = x1, y =
αx21
βx1+γx2
and α, β ∈ K∗. Let (x1, x2), (u1, u2) ∈ E1, and
D1 = (u1, u2)−∞.
For E we have hD(x, y) =
y−λx−ν
x−u , where D = (u, v) −∞, λ =
3u2+a
2v and
ν = −u
3+au+2b
2v . For E1, hD is replaced by
hE1D1(x1, x2) := hι1D1(ι1(x1, x2)) =
αx21
βx1+γx2
− λ′x1 − ν
′
x1 − u1
where
λ′ = λ(ι1(u1, u2)) =
3u21 + a
2
αu21
βu1+γu2
=
(3u21 + a)(βu1 + γu2)
2αu21
ν′ = ν(ι1(u1, u2)) ==
(−u31 + au1 + 2b)(βu1 + γu2)
2αu21
We see that hE1D1(x1, x2) is of the formA(u1, u2, x1, x2)/B(u1, u2, x1, x2) where
A is of degree 2 in x1 and x2 and degree 4 in u1 and u2, and B is of degree 2 in
x1 and x2 and degree 3 in u1 and u2.
Let m : E×E → E be the addition map as described above for the principal
site. Then the addition map m1 : E1 × E1 → E1 for E1 is i
−1
1 ◦m ◦ (i1, i1). For
(x1, y1, x2, y2) at the principal site where (x1, y1) ∈ E1 and (x2, y2) ∈ E, write
m1(x1, y1, x2, y2) = (x3, y3), then the formula for x3 and y3 as rational functions
in x1, y1, x2, y2 can be similarly worked out. The function describing x3 has the
form F/G where F (x1, y1, x2, y2) is of total degree 7, of degree 5 in x1, y1, of
degree 5 in x2, y2, and G(x1, y1, x2, y2) is of total degree 6, of degree 4 in x1, y1,
and of degree 4 in x2, y2. The function describing y3 has the form F/G where
F (x1, y1, x2, y2) is of total degree 16, of degree 11 in x1, y1, of degree 11 in x2, y2,
and G(x1, y1, x2, y2) is of total degree 15, of degree 10 in x1, y1, of degree 10 in
x2, y2.
Similarly Let τ : E → E be the doubling map as described above for the
principal site. Then the doubling map τ1 : E1 → E1 for E1 is i
−1
1 ◦τ ◦ (i1, i1). For
(x, y) at the principal site of τ where (x, y) ∈ E1, write τ1 : (x, y) = (x
′, y′), then
the formula for x′ and y′ as rational functions in x, y can be similarly worked
out. The function describing x′ has the form F/G where F (x, y) is of total degree
6, and G(x, y) is of total degree 2. The function describing y′ has the form F/G
where F (x, y) is of total degree 15, and G(x, y) is of total degree 11.
Perform a random birational transformation ι2 : E1 → E2 as described in
§ 2.5 and suppose ι−12 (z) = (L1(z), L2(z)) for z = (z1, z2, z3), where L1 and L2
are randomly chosen linear forms over K. Suppose z, z′ ∈ E2, and let Dz =
z −∞, where z = (z1, z2, z3) and z
′ = (z′1, z
′
2, z
′
3). Then h
E2
Dz
(z′) is of the form
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ϕ(z, z′) = A′(z, z′)/B′(z, z′) where A′(z, z′) = A(L1(z), L2(z), L1(z
′), L2(z
′))
and B′(z, z′) = B(L1(z), L2(z), L1(z
′), L2(z
′)). Both A′ and B′ are likely dense
for some degree at least 2 in z and in z′, in which case they are both safe for
specification.
The addition map for E2 is i
−1
2 ◦m1 ◦ (i2, i2). Similarly the doubling map for
E2 is i
−1
2 ◦ τ1 ◦ (i2, i2). The map m2 (resp. τ2) is defined by 3 rational functions.
As they are formed with randomly chosen i2, the polynomials describing them
are likely dense for some degree at least 2, hence safe for specification.
Therefore, to specify the program for eˆ on E2, it is enough to specify O(d)
many descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set of 7 rational func-
tions, three functions that define the addition map on E2, three functions that
define the doubling map, and one function ϕ(z, z′) for defining hE2Dz(z
′). These 7
functions are secret since ι1 and ι2 are secret. The O(d) descent functions and
maps can be specified properly such that the specification contains no global
descent.
We have proved the following:
Theorem 2. Efficient computation for the blinded pairing eˆℓ on Eˆ[ℓ] can be
properly specified, such that the specification does not contain any global descent.
More precisely, to specify the program for eˆ, it is enough to specify O(d) many
descent functions with blinded constant factors of a set of 7 rational functions.
By performing a random secret birational transformation the 7 functions are
secret and likely dense for some degree at least 2, in which case the specification
is safe from the linear attack described in § 2.4.
8 Open problems
We summarize several computational problems which are important to the secu-
rity of the trilinear map discussed in this paper. For simplicity we focus on the
elliptic curve case and assume only one secret descent basis is used in the con-
struction instead of two. The discussion naturally extends to the general case of
Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves and where two descent bases are used.
Let u be a randomly chosen basis of K over k. Suppose E is an elliptic curve
defined over K and µℓ ⊂ K. Suppose we have formed a birational model E2
of E as in § 7 such that the two polynomials defining E2 are dense in degree
2. Moreover the rational function ϕ describing hE2Dz (z
′) for computing eℓ, and
the 6 functions describing the addition map and the doubling map are safe for
specification.
We now call E2 as E and m2 as m, and τ2 as τ .
As in § 3, we choose a set of N = O(d2) many (0, 1)-matrices M1, . . . ,MN
that span Matd(Fℓ), so that each M =Mi has the following properties:
1. There are exactly two nonzero entries (i, i1) and (i, i2) for row i, for i =
0, . . . , d− 1.
2. Let EM = {(i− i1 mod d, i− i2 mod d : i = 0, . . . , d− 1}. For (a, b) ∈ EM ,
let IM,a,b = {i : (i − i1, i − i2) = (a, b) mod d}. Then |IMi,a,b| = Θ(d
ǫ) for
all (a, b) ∈ EMi , for some positive constant ǫ < 1,
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Again, we have the following commutative diagram:
Eˆ[ℓ]
ρ
→
∏
i E
σi [ℓ]
∏
i
σ−i
→ E[ℓ]d
↓ Ψi ↓ ϕMi
Eˆ[ℓ]
ρ
→
∏
i E
σi [ℓ]
∏
i
σ−i
→ E[ℓ]d
Let C = {(i − i1 mod d, i − i2 mod d : i = 0, . . . , d − 1}. For (a, b) ∈
C, let Ia,b = {i : (i − i1, i − i2) = (a, b) mod d}. Let Ωa,b = W
Ia,bΓIa,b . By
Proposition 11, the set of Ψi can be specified by specifying mˆ, making public C,
and Ωa,b for every (a, b) ∈ C.
From the published information: Dα, Dβ ∈ Eˆ[ℓ], specified mˆ, specified τˆ ,
specified ϕ ◦ δ, and the set of Ωa,b, (a, b) ∈ C, can u be efficiently determined?
From the above-mentioned published information, together with the set R
of quadratic relations on the matrices Mi described in § 3, can the trapdoor
discrete-log problem on G3 be solved efficiently?
The following problems that do not involve the pairing computation can be
separated out and more narrowly defined. Solving any one of these problems
efficiently will break the trilinear map.
1. Assume the birational model E for an elliptic curve, the addition map m :
E×E → E and the doubling map τ : E → E are safe for specification, and mˆ
and τˆ are properly specified (for the principal sites, each by 3d polynomials
of degree O(1) in 3d variables over k). Can u be determined efficiently?
2. A set S of O(d2) subsets of {0, . . . , d−1} is secretly chosen, each subset I is of
cardinality Θ(dǫ) for some positive constant ǫ < 1. The set of matricesW IΓI
is made public (Γ is the matrix whose i-th row is uσi for i = 0, . . . , d − 1,
andW = Γ−1). Can u be determined efficiently? This problem is abstracted
as a subproblem from the next problem.
3. The trapdoor discrete logarithm problem as described in § 3, both the generic
version, which does not involve A = E, and the version that allows public
identity testing, which involves A = E but does not involve pairing. We re-
mark that the generic version can be reduced to solving a system of quadratic
polynomials in dO(1) variables. However the best known method for solving
such systems has time complexity exponential in the number of variables.
Whether or a not there is a secure trilinear map without a trapdoor is an
interesting open problem. The approach in [8],which proceeds more closely along
the line suggested by Chinburg and does not involve Weil descent, remains to
be further investigated.
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